CHAPTER 16

Waves of Globalization in East Asia

A Historical Perspective

Yongseok Seo and Shunichi Takekawa

If we define "globalization" as the flow of things around the world, then what we now call globalization is not uniquely modern, nor is it merely a phenomenon of the late twentieth century resulting from new technologies and social systems. Rather, it is a process as old as humanity that began from the earliest days of human existence. Widespread diffusion of culture, religion, technology, and political-economic systems from a few major centers is an ancient phenomenon. The difference that makes contemporary globalization special is its unprecedented speed and the intensity of its flow. The following brief historical survey of China, Japan, and Korea illustrates the way waves of global or regional ideas, institutions, technologies, and people have impacted the three areas and how people in the three areas responded to them.

Four Global Waves of the Premodern Era

The melding, borrowing, and adaptation of external influences can be found in many areas of human life throughout history. East Asia developed its own civilization through frequent contact and exchanges with the outside world. This section will discuss global flows in premodern East Asia, showing how East Asians accommodated, adopted, or rejected outside influences. We will focus on four of the most important global flows in premodern East Asia: Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity.

Buddhism

As one of the world's great religions and philosophies, Buddhism has had a profound impact on all of Asia throughout history. According to legend, Gautama Siddhartha (563–483 BC) founded Buddhism in the northeastern part of India. He later became known as the Buddha and preached paths to achieve enlightenment (nirvana). Buddhism was then transmitted in two major directions:

into Southeast Asia as Theravada Buddhism and into China as Mahayana Buddhism, where it later filtered into Korea and Japan.

China

It is not clear when Buddhism reached China, but historians generally agree that it was via Central Asia (the Silk Roads) around the first century AD. In the beginning, Buddhist practices were resisted by the Chinese in preference to the prevailing Confucianism. However, the demise of the Han Dynasty in AD 220 and the chaotic period that followed facilitated the spread of Buddhism throughout China. By the late fourth century AD, the common people as well as the ruling class began to accept Buddhism. Over time, Buddhism became integrated with local traditions and culture. Although Buddhism had a great impact on the arts and religion of the Chinese people, there is little evidence that Buddhist ideas influenced Chinese political ideology and government institutions. Instead, as we will show, Confucianism played a pivotal role in the governing system of China for two millennia and was not challenged until the Western influence of the late nineteenth century.

Korea

Buddhism was first introduced to Korea around the fourth century AD from China. Before its arrival, ancient Koreans practiced shamanism that was based on spirits within living things and natural forces. Korea was divided into three separate kingdoms: Koguryŏ, Paekche, and Silla. Buddhism first arrived in the northern kingdom of Koguryŏ and gradually spread to Paekche, in the southwest, finally reaching southeastern Silla in the fifth century AD.

Initially, Buddhism faced great resistance from the indigenous people. In Silla, in particular, the nobles rejected Buddhism and remained faithful to the traditional gods. The Silla court recognized Buddhism only after the martyrdom of Ichadon in AD 527. Eventually, Buddhism became a tool that enabled ruling elites in Silla to gain power and to possess a set of beliefs that enabled them to conquer Paekche and Koguryŏ. After the unification, the ruling class of Silla incorporated Buddhist ideals into Confucianism so that Buddhism was able to maintain its status with little opposition throughout the Unified Silla (668–935) and Koguryŏ (935–1392) periods. However, with the downfall of the Koguryŏ dynasty in 1392, Buddhism slowly declined as the new rulers of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) adopted neo-Confucianism. This led to the oppression and restriction of Buddhism by political elites of the Chosŏn dynasty.

Japan

The formal introduction of Buddhism into Japan was by a Korean king in AD 552, although most historians agree that it was actually present before that time.

The impression of Buddhism held by the imperial court that worshiped Shinto was generally negative, but the head of the Soga families who served the court gained permission from the emperor to adopt Buddhism. However, Buddhism was banned after many people died from an epidemic, of which the Mononobe families claimed Buddhism was the cause. In 587, the Soga, seeking to lead the regime, won the battle against the Mononobe and started to worship Buddhism openly. Subsequently, Prince Shōtoku (574–622)[1] reconciled Buddhism with the native Japanese religion, called Shinto today. Since then, Shinto and Buddhism have coexisted in Japan. However, Buddhism, along with Confucianism, was mostly for the court and aristocrats who used it to sustain their governance and spiritual life during the early days. Being supported by the court and aristocrats, Buddhist art and temple architecture with Chinese traits bloomed in the capital, Heijokyo, located in present-day Nara.

With the decline of the imperial reign and the rise of the samurai warrior class, Buddhism became more popular. During the Kamakura period, the practice of Zen attracted many samurai. Meanwhile, new Buddhist sects, whose monks studied Buddhism in Japan, and not China, emerged and began to disseminate their theories. In particular, monks who developed appealing Buddhist beliefs and practices walked through towns and villages, attracting common people who were suffering from war, natural disasters, famines, and numerous daily problems. Thus Buddhism became domesticated in Japan.

Confucianism

China

Among China's many contributions to globalization, Confucianism has probably had the deepest impact on political and social concepts in East Asia over the last two millennia. Confucianism was founded by Confucius (551–479 BC) and was developed by his successors in ancient China. Unlike Buddhism, Confucianism is a social system and a set of ethical values rather than a religion. It deals with primary values and basic human relationships that originate from an individual's family. Confucianism was transmitted from China to Korea, Japan, and Vietnam and has become an important social and political value system deeply embedded in them. See Jim Dator's Further Thoughts, "Civil Society in East Asia," on page 239.

Korea

Although Confucianism was introduced into Korea before Buddhism, its ideological flourishing took place later, with the introduction of neo-Confucianism during the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn periods.[2] However, early Confucianism enormously influenced and transformed Korean society and political systems during the Three Kingdoms era (first through eighth century AD). Unlike

the arrival of Buddhism, there was no significant resistance to Confucianism in Korea. Rather, it was effectively used by ruling elites as a means of governing people. Unified Silla adapted Confucianism, merging it with the uniquely Korean monarchical system whereby top administrative positions were given to practicing Confucian officials who had connections with the royal family. In the process of state growth, the Silla class system (known as the "bone-rank" system) began to pose an obstacle to the supremacy of the king. Thus the monarchy introduced Confucianism in order to alter the traditional political processes and to centralize political power, modeled after China.[3] Confucianism flourished in the relatively stable atmosphere of the Unified Silla and Koryŏ dynasty. By the end of the fourteenth century, newly emerged neo-Confucian intellectuals who founded the Chosŏn dynasty collaborated with the military, and the new rulers adopted neo-Confucianism as the governing ideology.

Japan

Confucianism was also introduced to Japan via Korea. Prince Shōtoku relied on the essence of Confucianism to build the first centralized state in the Japanese archipelago. His intentions were realized in the so-called Constitution of Seventeen Articles, which stressed that people should live in social harmony. When the imperial family, along with some aristocratic families, revolted against the Soga families and took control of the Yamato court in 645, they planned to build a new state structure by imitating the centralized Chinese imperial dynasty. The idea was spelled out in the Taika administrative and penal code. Under the code, aristocratic family members would serve the court as officials, and ordinary people would become subjects of the court. Yet the imperial family and their governance based on the Chinese Confucian tradition gradually declined, and cultural and commercial exchange with China also diminished. The central government kept its authority but had to rely on local powers. The Heian period (794–1185) also is characterized by "a considerable domestication of imported civilization."[4]

Neo-Confucianism became the official doctrine of the Tokugawa polity (1603–1867). Its emphasis on loyalty and social order was believed to support good governance. The Tokugawa employed Confucian scholars as its officials, preferring the school of neo-Confucianism called Shushi created by the Chinese philosopher Zhuxi (1130–1200), because of its emphasis on loyalty. On the other hand, the Tokugawa banned another school, formulated by the Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming, or Ōyōmei[5] (1472–1529), since the Tokugawa believed that the school's emphasis on independent thought and action would harm social order.

The various branches of Confucianism and Chinese tradition were collectively designated the Schools of Chinese Learning (Kangaku-ha). Japanese Confucianism disregarded some important aspects of Chinese Confucianism, such

as the "Mandate of Heaven" and the right of the people to revolt against irresponsible rulers. In this respect, like Buddhism in earlier centuries, Confucianism was also domesticated as a governance tool by the rulers. Yet the ignored aspects of Confucianism gradually came to be known by Japanese scholars and well-educated samurai and eventually were used to support the samurai who opposed the Tokugawa. Meanwhile, Schools of National Learning (Kokugaku-ha) emerged. These schools subsequently provided a theoretical background for the Meiji Restoration and contributed to the rise of modern Japanese nationalism.

Islam

The prophet Mohammed (AD 570–632) founded Islam in 622. Although historians generally regard Islam as the newest among the three major global religions, Muslims believe that Mohammed was just the last of a series of prophets and that Islam existed long before Mohammed.[6] According to Soo-Il Jung, "Islam is a mode of comprehensive life that encompasses politics, economics, society and culture, and is a system of religion and practice that embraces both secular and sacred life."[7]

China

According to historians, Arabian traders first introduced Islam to China in the mid-seventh century via the Silk Road. After that, a number of Muslim merchants, traders, and migrants began to visit China for commercial and religious purposes, and they often returned with Chinese technologies (represented by the Four Great Inventions of paper, printing, the compass, and gunpowder). Muslims who migrated to China had a great impact and influence on the economy as well. Yusuf Abdul Rahman states,

> Muslims virtually dominated the import/export business in China during Sung Dynasty (960–1279 CE). The office of Director General of Shipping was consistently held by a Muslim during this period. During the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 CE), a period considered to be the golden age of Islam in China, Muslims fully integrated into Han society by adopting Chinese names and some customs while retaining their Islamic mode of dress and dietary restrictions.[8]

Large numbers of Muslims became government officials in the Mongolian-led Yuan dynasty (AD 1279–1368) court. Chinese-Muslim scholars employed ancient Chinese philosophical concepts to explain the principles of Islam and wrote and translated numerous works using Chinese ideographs. In fact, many Han Chinese, as well as Mongolians and Uighurs, converted to Islam. Muslims in China, however, were oppressed later, during the Manchu and communist periods. In 1953, Muslims rose up against communist China in order to build an

independent Islamic nation, but they were brutally suppressed. Today, the Muslim population is estimated to be around twenty million and exists among ten distinct ethnic minorities in China.[9]

Korea

According to an Arab record, active trade occurred between the Silla kingdom in Korea and the Islamic world. Ibn Khurdadhibah was the first Arabian geographer to leave records about the exchange between Arab Muslims and Silla. A new era unfolded during the Koryŏ dynasty. A large number of Muslim merchants and traders came to Korea for commercial reasons, and from that time Islamic values and culture began to spread all over Korea. Some Muslim traders and merchants settled in Korea as permanent residents, and Islamic communities were formed in Korea for the first time.[10] However, the impact of Islamic culture on Korean politics and society was relatively limited compared to Buddhism and Confucianism.

Christianity

Christianity is probably the most globalized faith in the world, especially in the last few centuries. It is claimed that "there are about two billion Christians in the world today, of whom 560 million, the largest single bloc, live in Europe. Latin America, though, is close behind with 480 million. Africa has 360 million, and 313 million Asians profess Christianity. North America claims about 260 million believers."[11] However, Christianity may have been even more global in its early period than is realized, and a few historians emphasize the significance of Christian traditions in premodern Asia. In *A History of Christianity in Asia,* Samuel H. Moffett argues that Christianity had been widely diffused in Asia long before the modern missionary movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[12] Philip Jenkins also observes, "In the thirteenth century, the height of medieval Christian civilization in Europe, there may have been more Christian believers on the continent of Asia than in Europe, while Africa still had populous Christian communities."[13] This section will briefly explore the varied history of Christianity as a global influence as it spread across the East Asian continent.

China

Historians in general agree that Christianity (the Nestorian sect) first reached Asia as early as the seventh century AD and left many unique theological works written in Chinese during the Tang dynasty. Some even argue that the Chinese Christian tradition at that time was more sophisticated than in Europe in terms of scholarly achievement in theology, philosophy, and literature. However, Christianity failed to take root in China due to the strong Confucian tradition and the predominance of Buddhism. The Nestorian and Catholic faiths returned to

China during the Yuan dynasty, and in 1299 the first Roman Catholic church was erected in Beijing. The Mongol dynasty was generous to all religions and even employed Nestorians in its court. After the Chinese expelled the Mongols from China and established the Ming dynasty in 1368, Christianity in China began to decline. Jesuit missionaries came to China during the transitional period between the Ming and Qing dynasties in the sixteenth through seventeenth centuries. Matteo Ricci (1521–1610) was one of the missionaries allowed to live in Beijing. Although some Jesuits tolerated the incorporation of local Chinese religious practices into their liturgies and practices, conflicts between traditional Confucian rituals and Christianity eventually led to the expulsion of Christianity from China.

Korea

In Korea, there is no record of Christianity before the middle of the eighteenth century, when a few Korean envoys to China first introduced Christianity. Matteo Ricci's *Tianzhu* (The true doctrine of the Lord of Heaven) was also promulgated at this time. An intellectual group of *silhak* (practical learning) scholars began to study "the Catholic literature with hopes of learning about Western civilization." By the early nineteenth century, a number of Koreans converted to the Catholic Church, and by 1866 there were eight foreign clerics with more than eighteen thousand believers in Korea. However, Chosŏn government officials feared Christianity would disrupt the basis of Confucian social order, believing that "many elements of Christian doctrine conflicted with the basic ethical and ritual principles of Confucianism."[14] Thus the government issued an edict ordering adherents of the "evil learning" to be treated as guilty of high treason and initiated a series of persecutions. The resulting actions weakened the potential Christian impact until the modernization reforms of 1894.[15]

Japan

Islam never had an impact on Japanese society, but Christianity became a factor that changed medieval Japan drastically. Western Christians brought new technologies that terrorized Japanese leaders. In the sixteenth century, Portuguese traders came to the Japanese archipelago with Christian missionaries, introducing various Western commodities along with a new religion. The Spanish gradually followed the Portuguese. They arrived during the Warring States period (1467–1615), during which samurai warlords fought against each other to protect their territories or to unify the states. The foreign traders were welcomed especially in Kyushu, the southernmost main island of Japan, since they brought useful commodities and technologies such as firearms. A number of warlords converted to Christianity, though some of them reportedly became Christians mainly to increase their trade with the foreigners.

The Warring States period ended with the triumph of three successful warlords. The first, Oda Nobunaga, tolerated Christianity. However, the second, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, at first did not allow the Westerners to preach Christianity, though he did not officially ban it. Then in 1587 Hideyoshi ordered Christian priests to leave Japan. In 1597 he executed Western and Japanese Christians, fearing the political implications of Christianity. The third unifier, Tokugawa Ieyasu, maintained good relations with Westerners, including the Spanish and Portuguese. But the Dutch and English, who did not intend to disseminate Christianity, recommended that Tokugawa abort trade ties with the Catholic countries of Spain and Portugal. Tokugawa began the persecution of Christians, and his successor, Tokugawa Hidetada, executed Christian missionaries and ordered Japanese Christians to convert to Buddhism on pain of death. Subsequently, the Tokugawa regime closed the country to all Westerners except the Dutch.

During the Meiji period, the government lifted the ban on Christianity. It is notable that even though the population of Christians remained small in Japan, some former samurai became Christians and emerged as major political leaders, activists, and educators.

Conclusions for the Premodern Era

The four global waves that swept over premodern East Asia— Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity—either adapted to local cultures through a successful fusion, developed into a unique combination, or perished due to local resistance. Confucianism and Buddhism were successfully localized and deeply embedded in the societies of East Asia. Buddhism developed differently in each country, linking with indigenous values, religions, and belief systems such as Confucianism, shamanism, and Shintoism. East Asian ruling elites often attempted to incorporate Confucianism and Buddhism into traditional political systems and indigenous religious traditions. Accordingly, Confucianism was molded to meet aboriginal needs and tastes and therefore developed differently in China, Korea, and Japan

On the other hand, despite its rich history in seventh- and eighth-century China, Christianity failed to take root as a religious faith. Christianity also encountered strong local resistance, particularly from the ruling elites in sixteenth century Japan and in nineteenth century Korea. Why did Christianity fail to become established in premodern East Asia, while Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam to some extent took root? Moffett attributes the "failure of Asian Christianity" to "geographical isolation, chronic numerical weakness, persecution, encounters with formidable Asian religions, ethnic introversion, dependence upon the state, and the Church's own internal divisions."[16] Indeed, Christianity, due to its exclusive nature, failed to compromise with the aboriginal cultures and

prompted many conflicts, particularly with Confucian traditions. This eventually led to the failure of Christianity to develop as a kind of Christianity with East Asian characteristics.

Global Waves in the Modern Era

The Western concepts "modern" or "modernization"—along with their by-products, Westernization, imperialism, nationalism, capitalism, and communism—were the most widespread ideas in East Asia and the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This section will survey how East Asians viewed, accommodated, developed, and combined these new values and ideologies.

Response to Western Encroachment in the Nineteenth Century

Although it is difficult to say precisely when "modernity" began, the origin of the modern age is often said to be around the sixteenth century, when Europe experienced unprecedented social, political, and economic transformation. Historians like Elizabeth Eisenstein attribute the transformation to the effects of the printing press on medieval Europe. She argues that the printing press was crucial in enabling the Renaissance, the Reformation, mercantilism, and the Scientific Revolution.[17]

China

As Ming-fong Kuo and Andreas Weiland point out, "the advent of 'modernity' in East Asia is usually connected with the intrusion of the Western imperialist world system."[18] By the early nineteenth century, China began to rapidly lose its supremacy to the modernizing and industrializing West. The initial Chinese response was to reject Western ideas and practices. Although the new world order of the time demanded that China adapt to new circumstances, there was no imperative within the Chinese social system itself to respond to this demand. China's actions were based on an enormous self-confidence that stemmed from "the ideology of the middle kingdom."[19] However, resistance to change only brought humiliation and defeat along with a series of unequal treaties, forcing China to concede a portion of its territory to Western powers.

Japan

Japan also faced Western imperialist intruders in the first half of the nineteenth century. A possible Russian invasion was frequently anticipated by the daimyo. Yet the actual intrusion, with a huge impact, was made by the Americans. Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay with four warships in 1853 and forced the Tokugawa to open Japan's ports to American vessels. The

Tokugawa made treaties with the United States and eventually opened its ports to other Western countries. Its isolationist policy, *sakoku,* was ended by treaties that resulted in favoring Western countries at the expense of Japan's sovereignty.

In 1867, the Tokugawa renounced the political authority that it had acquired 250 years earlier. The emperor restored his own political supremacy. This power transition was mainly backed by the powerful Satusma, Chŏshu, and Tosa warlords who had been previously subjugated by the Tokugawa. Relatively low-class samurai of those warlords promoted this quasi-revolution and became de facto political leaders of the new Japan. Their pro-imperial movement originally started as actions against the Westerners who had forced the Tokugawa to open the nation. In a sense, the Western intrusion kindled Japan's protonationalism among those samurai who subsequently found their spiritual roots in the imperial family and Shinto. Historians and thinkers, influenced by the Schools of National Learning, provided theoretical reasons to be against Western intrusion. The slogan "Honor the emperor, expel the barbarians" *(Sonnō joi)* represents the view of these samurai. The Meiji Restoration thus was a nationalist movement even though participants were mostly only samurai.

Korea

Korea also felt serious threats from Western imperialist encroachment, and its initial response to the new world system was to resist. During the regency of the Taewongun (Grand Prince from 1864 to 1874), the central government attempted a series of reforms to revitalize the dynasty. "The Taewongun used many devices to strengthen the central administration, the monarchy, and the royal family. . . . He recruited talent much more widely, reorganized the central administration, and revised the law codes. Despite all these efforts to revitalize tradition and even use modern means to defend it, the Taewongun was vigorously exclusionist."[20] In policy struggles, the Taewongun presented resistance to all change in defense of isolationism, Confucianism, and Korean traditions. However, he was overthrown by his enlightened son, King Kojong, and Korea finally was forced to open to the outside world through Japanese gunboat diplomacy in 1875.

Modernization or Westernization?

To counter threats of Western imperialism and to avoid colonization by the West, East Asian leaders recognized that the need to respond effectively was urgent. However, it is doubtful that many East Asian leaders in the late nineteenth century distinguished between modernization and Westernization in their varied efforts to achieve a strong and stable nation-state. Modernization meant Westernization—the process of adapting Western values, ideologies, science and

technology, political-economic systems, and, in short, the near-total assimilation of Western culture. As Kuo and Weiland put it,

> The entire frame of reference of the term "modern," the contextual field of the debate within which the term occurs, reflects the immanent assumption that modernity is to be equated with Western modernity and that modernization in East Asia is nothing but the enforcement of a Western (in itself "modern") influence which pushes aside indigenous (per se "traditional") forms of culture.[21]

China

In Qing China (1644–1912), Western science and languages were studied, special schools were opened in the larger cities, and arsenals, factories, and shipyards were established according to Western models. The Qing government also adopted Western diplomatic practices and sent students abroad. The effort to import Western technology into Chinese institutions became known as the "Self-Strengthening Movement" (1860–1895). Han Chinese officials directed this movement and were responsible for establishing Western institutions, developing basic industries, and Westernizing the military. But despite its efforts, the Self-Strengthening Movement failed to recognize the significance of the political and social evolution that had accompanied Western advances and innovations. In one sense, the Chinese Westernizing movement failed because it applied only Western "practical knowledge" while retaining the traditional Chinese mentality of Confucianism. However, Japan's military defeat of China in 1895 was a great shock, particularly to the Chinese traditionalists who had been trying to restore the Confucian tradition. In 1898, the Qing emperor Guangxu (1875–1908) ordered a series of reforms aimed at sweeping social and institutional changes. Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) were the principal intellectual architects of these changes. They declared that China needed more than "self-strengthening" and that innovation must be accompanied by institutional and ideological change. The imperial edicts for reform covered a broad range of subjects, including legal systems and governmental structures with Western values and ideology instead of neo-Confucian orthodoxy. However, the reformers' vision ended up being only a vision. The reform plans encountered intense opposition from the conservative ruling elite, especially the Manchu.

Japan

After the Meiji Restoration, in order to prevent the nation from being colonized by Westerners, the protonationalist Meiji leaders drastically Westernized Japanese society. They believed it was the only way to overturn the unequal treaties with the West and to make the country competitive with the Western powers.

Meiji leaders transformed former lords into aristocrats who had no substantial political power while demolishing the differences between the former four classes (samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants) that marked the Tokugawa period. The privileges of samurai, such as wearing swords, were legally forbidden. More important, their hereditary pensions were terminated, so they had to find jobs or start businesses in order to make a living. Frustrated former samurai joined insurgencies and other anti-governmental movements. Afterward, former samurai became promoters of the people's rights movement and demanded a constitution and parliament. As a result, they also joined the Westernization movement.

Indeed, the Meiji government introduced a constitution, parliament (called the "Diet"), and cabinet system as parts of their Westernization project. But it should be noted that the Meiji leaders did not import everything they found in Western civilization. The leaders carefully studied Western customs, including political, economic, and social systems, and introduced their preferred Western-style organizations while modifying those organizations.[22] They kept some aspects of Japanese tradition and redefined them. They carefully wrote a constitution guided by Western scholars and even redefined the role of the imperial family.[23] Regardless of their intention, the imperial family symbolically and institutionally played a significant role in the creation of a modern nation by making itself visible in public and becoming the backbone of new ideologies.[24]

Meanwhile, Meiji leaders and intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi urged former samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants to catch up with the West. Newly established schools and media became tools of Westernization. *Bunmei kaika* (enlightenment and civilization) was a slogan that exhorted people to Westernize and modernize.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that Japanese modernization was not merely a reaction to the Western powers. Modernization had already begun indigenously during the Tokugawa period. Indeed, Japan was in many ways a "modern" nation when Perry arrived. The 250-year-old Tokugawa era generated a nationwide market economy, began to commercialize agriculture, and experienced very significant urbanization.[25] Edo (now Tokyo), the de facto political capital; Osaka, the de facto business capital; Kyoto, the old capital; and castle cities of warlord territories were well connected by roads. Coastal shipping allowed merchants to trade a variety of agricultural and handcrafted products from city to city. The three capitals, Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto, were the world's largest cities by the middle of the Tokugawa period. Wealthy merchants *(gōshō)* who were richer than the small warlords emerged, and some of them became Japanese business conglomerates *(zaibatsu)* after the Meiji Restoration. Literacy and standards of general education were very high—certainly higher than in Europe during the same time. Without the development of these and other factors, Meiji Japan would have taken a different path.

Korea

Modern Western ideas began to exert a powerful influence on a group of *yangban* (Korean aristocracy) officials in Korea. These officials realized that Korea needed to transform its traditional institutions and values into a progressive and Western style. King Kojong and his clique took measures designed to promote "enlightenment" and "self-strengthening," establishing several new government institutions replicating Chinese administrative innovation while sending talented young officials to inspect Meiji Japan's Westernized institutions.[26] Highly inspired by the Japanese version of "civilization and enlightenment," the reform-minded young *yangban* officials attempted a bloody coup d'etat in 1884.[27] As Eckert, Lee, and Lew point out, the coup d'etat "aimed to establish an independent and efficient modern state with an egalitarian social order, to replace the oligarchy, *yangban*-centered socio political structure of the Chosŏn dynasty."[28] However, the coup ended in disastrous failure. It failed not only because of strong resistance from the conservative faction within the government, but also because of lack of popular support from the masses who had a fierce resentment against Japanese imperialism.

Although the coup failed, the promulgation of a fourteen-point reform program showed that there was a strong desire to develop a modern nation. In the document, "the reformers called for the termination of Korea's tributary ties to China, curtailment of *yangban* privileges, appointment of officials on the basis of merit, central control of fiscal and military administration, and the concentration of decision-making power in a state council."[29] The Korean reformist illusion about Japan evaporated with Japan's assertion of its supremacy over Korea in 1905. Korea's dream to become an independent, modern nation-state temporarily ended with Korea's annexation by Japan in 1910.

Communism and Nationalism in East Asia

Nationalism and communism were two dominant ideologies and by-products of Western modernity that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe. Although the definitions of both nationalism and communism are controversial, these two ideologies attained appeal beyond Europe and swept over East Asia in the twentieth century. Even in the twenty-first century nationalism continues to assert its power. People and governments around the world today continue to have a strong sense of attachment to their nation in response to globalization. With the demise of the Soviet empire, nationalism rapidly replaced the communist ideological vacuum in former communist countries. Nonetheless, China, Vietnam, and North Korea continue to identify themselves as communist states as of 2005.

In *Imagined Communities,* Benedict Anderson says that a nation "is an imagined political community," because "members of even the smallest nations will

never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[30] Anderson asserts that "the nation's very origins can be traced to the rise of print capitalism and the appearance of mass vernacular newspapers."[31] Books, newspapers, and novels began to be published in vernacular languages with the new, faster, and cheaper method of duplication. This gave readers the idea that they belonged to a shared linguistic and ideological community and made it possible for them to imagine the "nation." Also, a standard national language, either spoken or written, could not have emerged as such before the advent of the printing press. Nationalism was thus, according to Anderson, a socially constructed phenomenon of modernity. By the end of the nineteenth century, nationalistic ideas began to infiltrate East Asia, and the notion of a modern nation-state began to develop in response to Western imperialistic encroachment.

Chinese nationalism

In China,[32] because of the failure of various reform movements from the top and the danger of colonization by the Western (and Japanese) imperial powers, intellectuals and political groups began to acknowledge the need for an "awakening of the consciousness of the nation to its own existence."[33] Chinese nationalism was influenced by a variety of ideological forces including Marxism, American pragmatism, social Darwinism, and traditional Chinese thought. Chinese nationalism presented itself in many different expressions, communism being but one.[34]

The immense expanse and variety of the Chinese nation and of China as a nation-state has been articulated by many intellectuals and political leaders. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was the central figure who attempted to define the nation ethnically. Sun identified being Han with being Chinese and excluded the Manchus from the Chinese nation.[35] For Sun, Chinese of all social classes, including overseas Chinese, made up the nation. According to Fitzgerald, what China needed—and Sun wanted—was control. Later, many of Sun's political ideologies (e.g., advocating one-party rule) were adopted by both Chiang Kai-shek on the right and Mao Zedong on the left.

The peak of Chinese nationalism was the May Fourth Movement. Resentment and disappointment exploded on May 4, 1919, with massive student demonstrations against the incompetent government in Beijing on the one hand and Japanese aggression on the other.[36] The demonstrations, led by nationalistic students and reformist intellectuals, developed into a "national awakening." Students and intellectuals returned from abroad (mainly from Japan and France) and stood at the center of the movement. They blamed Confucianism and China's obsolete value system for China's humiliating defeats at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists. They advocated Western ideas and ideologies rang-

ing from the "complete Westernization of China" to "socialism" as alternatives to Confucianism. Over the next few decades (from the 1920s to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949), Chinese nationalism was deeply influenced by social Darwinism and Russian ethnographic ideas. During communist rule after 1949, Chinese nationalism further mixed with elements of Marxism and Leninism. The decay of communism and the emergence of global capitalism led to a resurrection of strong nationalism within China.

Chinese communism

Like nationalism, communism was also an invention of nineteenth-century Europe. Communism is a theory and system of social and political organization. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, under the influence of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, "the term *communism* has been used to denote a form of classless society based on common ownership of the means of production."[37] Communism was introduced to China by people like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, both of whom were inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1917. By 1920, people associated with the Comintern (Communist International) were disseminating literature in China and helping to start communist groups, including one led by Mao Zedong. A number of Marxist groups came together and formed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 in Shanghai. Li Dazhao, a leader of the May Fourth Movement and cofounder of the CCP with Chen Duxiu, had a nationalistic view of communism. Mao Zedong also associated nationalism with communism so that he could exclude the bourgeoisie and landlords from the Chinese nation just as Sun excluded the Manchus.

Orthodox Marxism dictated that a communist revolution should begin among urban industrial labor. Li Dazhao, on the other hand, emphasized the role of the peasants in the communist revolution and deeply influenced Mao Zedong. Mao adapted Marxist theory to the underdeveloped conditions of agricultural China, much like Lenin did in early twentieth-century Russia. Mao tried to convince other communist leaders that a revolution on an urban and proletarian basis would not be appropriate in China. As Benjamin Schwartz indicates, Mao was able to realize that China's essential problem was a rural one and that only a revolution with the peasantry as its social basis would succeed.[38]

Korean nationalism

It is generally believed that Korean nationalism stems from the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) religious movement in the 1860s, which was formed in response to Western encroachment.[39] However, recent studies claim that modern Korean nationalism began with "Korea's disengagement from its traditional orientation toward China"[40] in the late nineteenth century. Korean reformist intellectuals who were educated in the West and Japan began to see China as a back-

ward and incompetent state where it had once been perceived as the center of civilization. Andre Schmid argues that it was an important shift that took place in Korean attitudes toward China from "reverence to criticism."[41] Korean reformist intellectuals believed that separating from China was the first step toward reinvigorating Korea's own independent national identity. Nationalistic historians like Sin Ch'aeho assembled a genealogical chart for the Korean *minjok* (nation) and presented a new notion of national identity. This period also observed the sudden public campaign for using the Korean vernacular script *hangŭl,* which had been neglected by Korean intellectuals for several hundred years. Other displays of Korean nationalism during this period included King Kojong's adoption of the designation "emperor" and the promulgation of the Great Korean Empire, along with the introduction of the Korean national flag, *taegŭkki.*[42]

During the Japanese occupation of Korea, Korean nationalists carried out independence struggles against Japanese colonial rule. However, the brutal suppression of the Korean nationalist movement on March 1, 1919, caused many younger Koreans to become militant resistors. Some of them went into China and the Russian maritime province, where they set up resistance forces. Various nationalist groups emerged during this period, including the exiled Korean provisional government in China. It was also from this period that Korean nationalists began to split into right and left nationalist groups. The left-wing nationalist group later developed into the Korean Communist Party.

As Japan's colonial rule over Korea became more established and her aggressive expansion more evident with the Manchuria Incident in 1931, right-wing Korean nationalists became more pro-Japanese and social Darwinists. They believed that the Korean nation had to be assimilated into a greater Japanese nation for the sake of the Korean people. Being influenced by Japanese imperialistic ideology, the right-wing Korean nationalists held a totalitarian perspective with fascist characteristics. This tradition of colonial nationalism continued in both Koreas even after 1945.

Korean communism

The idea of modern communism was first introduced to Korean intellectuals in the early twentieth century, with Korean communists founding numerous circles in China and Russia as well as within Korea. The left-wing nationalists began to resist Japanese colonialism by arming themselves with this strong ideology. By the 1930s, some communists formed armed groups in Manchuria and fought against the Japanese Kwangtung Army by using guerrilla warfare. The most well-known guerrilla leader of this time was Kim Il Sung.

After the foundation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), a left-wing version of nationalism was combined with communism and

became known as Juche (Self-Reliance). The key to Juche ideology is *chajusong* (autonomy or independence). Unlike classical Marxism, which sees the means of production being the key to history, Juche sees self-conscious man as an individual as being key. Each individual possessing independence, creativity, and consciousness creates the future. Moreover, Juche ideology also greatly emphasizes the role of the masses in creating a proletarian revolution, while stressing national self-reliance in politics, economics, and defense. The term *chajusong* itself reveals an essential sentiment of modern nationalism that accentuates the importance of "national independence and sovereignty of one's people."[43] As Kim Jong Il states in *On the Juche Idea,*

> If one is to establish *Juche* in thinking, one must be well versed in one's own thing. . . . Koreans must know well Korean history, geography, economics, culture and the customs of the Korean nation, and in particular our Party's policy, its revolutionary history and revolutionary tradition.[44]

In brief, the Juche ideology emerged in response to global ideologies such as Marxism and Leninism, Christianity, colonialism, and nationalism. It is a unique combination of these global ideas and traditional Korean thought.[45]

Although Korean nationalists and communists in the colonial period had a different vision for the future of Korea, they basically shared the same ultimate goal: independence from Japanese colonial rule and the building of a modern nation-state on the Korean peninsula. Even in the postcolonial era, Korean nationalists in both North and South Korea continue to seek the nation's own identity, along with the importance of the concept of *minjok*—common historiography, culture, language, and territory.

Japanese nationalism

Nationalistic sentiment grew throughout the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa periods. "Rich nation, strong army" *(Fukoku kyōhei)* clearly revealed the nationalistic sentiments of the Meiji leaders. Another Meiji government slogan, "Save capital, develop industries" *(Shokusan kogyo),* showed how to achieve this. They were successful to an impressive degree. Imperial Japan began to compete with Western powers. The victories of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) inflated Japanese nationalistic sentiment. As a result, Japan became expansionist, colonizing Taiwan and Korea and invading China. Ultimately Japan clashed against the rising Western power, the United States, in World War II. In a sense, Japanese nationalism pushed the nation into turmoil and created an unprecedented disaster in Asia.

Indigenous Modernization

China

The Chinese civil war between the communists and nationalists resumed after the war with Japan ended and was won by the CCP. Mao Zedong became chairman of the central government council of the newly established People's Republic of China in 1949. In an attempt to break with the Russian model of communism and to achieve rapid economic modernization, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which ended with a disastrous failure: twenty million people starved, and Mao withdrew from public view. A counter-reaction emerged in the form of the Cultural Revolution. The ostensible reason for the Cultural Revolution was to prevent development of a bureaucratized, Soviet-style communism in China. However, it had its roots in a power struggle between Mao and his political rivals. Through mass mobilization, some of the highest-ranking leaders were removed from power. Deng Xiaoping was among the best-known victims. In 1969, Mao reasserted his party leadership by serving as chairman of the Communist Party Congress, and he was named supreme commander of the nation and army. Mao closed schools and encouraged students to join Red Guard units, which persecuted Chinese teachers and intellectuals. Even Confucius was attacked as having been a hypocritical supporter of the bourgeoisie. The period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in China is now considered to be the "lost ten years" of building a modern nation. But it was nonetheless a dramatic Chinese attempt to "respond fairly" to some of the ills of globalizing communism of the time.

Deng Xiaoping became the most powerful Chinese leader after Mao. Since earlier attempts at developing China resulted instead in the country falling further and further behind in terms of national wealth and economic power, Deng and his affiliates initiated significant reforms that were labeled the "Four Modernizations" of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. Deng's reforms in the 1980s were comprehensive and full-scale efforts at fundamental transformation of economic, governmental, and political organizations for rebuilding China as a modern socialist nation according to global capitalist standards. The "modernizations" included a program for improving both rural and urban life, the structural adjustment of ownership, and reform of the financial and taxation systems. However, it is important to note that the reforms were made at the administrative level while keeping the overall communist political framework intact. In this context, the reforms in the 1980s had antecedents in the modernization efforts of the late nineteenth century—applying the West's "practical knowledge" while reaffirming the old mentality of Confucianism.

Korea

The initial Korean attempt to build a modern nation in the late nineteenth century failed due to domestic resistance and was later blocked by Japanese colonialists. South Korea began the modernization process only after its liberation from Japan, with the rate accelerating after 1961. Former military generals governed South Korea from 1961 to 1992. At the expense of individual rights, leisure time, and political freedom, the authoritarian military regimes accomplished rapid economic development and pulled the country out of poverty. During this period, the modernization theme was given considerable attention; the term became a popular catch phrase extolling efforts toward achieving self-sustaining economic growth and industrialization. The Japanese modernization model was again depicted as a desirable solution, harkening back to previous attempts in the late nineteenth century. The process of modernization is still ongoing in South Korea, but since the 1990s it has faced the next wave of global pressures (neoliberalism).

Japan

The history of imperial Japan ended in 1945 with the disastrous defeat in World War II. The Allied powers, led by the United States, democratized Japanese political, economic, and social systems, accusing the old systems of being too feudalistic and nationalistic. Nonetheless, Japanese nationalism was still alive, playing a vital role in postwar economic development. Chalmers Johnson regards Japan as a nationalistic developmental state.[46] In contrast to a market-rational state such as the United States, he contends, the developmental state is plan rational and goal oriented, attempting to reform the structure of its domestic industry and promote the nation's economic power. Economic nationalism motivates nationalistic bureaucrats to plan industrial policy and improve the nation's economic competitiveness in the world. Johnson believes this tendency dates back to the Meiji period: national slogans such as "Rich nation, strong army" in the prewar era and "Promote exports" *(Yushutsu shinko)* in the postwar era exemplify Japan's plan-rational and goal-oriented tendency.

From a different perspective, Noguchi Yukio contends that the postwar Japanese economy imitated "the 1940 system" (1940-*nen taisei*) that mobilized Japanese behind the nation's wartime goals.[47] He focuses on the role of both wartime and postwar bureaucrats. The so-called "innovative bureaucrats" *(kakushin kanryo)* played a significant role in the development of the wartime economy during the 1930s and 1940s, while postwar bureaucrats took over the role of reviving the nation's economy around manufacturing and trade. Noguchi says that both Marxism and Nazi corporatism influenced the wartime bureaucrats, while the postwar bureaucrats were socialist oriented. Here again foreign models appeared in Japan-modified versions.

Concluding the Modern Era

Modernization, along with its by-products—nationalism, capitalism, and communism—characterized late nineteenth- and twentieth-century East Asia. As Kuo and Weiland point out, however, "modernization in East Asia is nothing but the enforcement of a Western (in itself 'modern') influence."[48] As the China, Japan, and Korea cases reveal, modernity in late nineteenth-century East Asia was generally equated with Westernization. In the process of "modernization," East Asian societies had to adopt Western values and ideologies, and at the same time they attempted to depart from their traditions (Confucianism in particular) in order to be accepted by the Western powers. In addition, East Asian leaders struggled to build strong nation-states and to create national consciousness through an "awakening nation" in order to avoid colonization by the West. For this reason, nationalism has always been the bottom line in East Asia throughout the centuries, and it continues to assert its existence even today in response to globalization.

Since the 1920s, communism has played a key role in the development of East Asia, particularly in China and Korea. However, we also see that the East Asian communist movement was one way, among many others, of presenting nationalism. Mao Zedong associated nationalism with communism by "awakening the Chinese nation," while left-wing Korean nationalists resisted Japanese colonialism by arming themselves with the strong and more sophisticated ideology of communism. In other words, nationalism and communism in East Asia were not binary; rather, they were hybridized under the processes of colonization and modernization. Communism was used by the early East Asian communist leaders as an ideological tool for building an independent nation-state, rather than as a step toward attaining the world communism that Marx believed would be achieved by historical necessity. In this process, however, both nationalists and communists in East Asia ignored ideals of nonviolence, liberalism, human rights, and democracy, and this vicious tradition continues to suppress people in some parts of East Asia. Nevertheless, the modern period was dramatic, as East Asia attempted to "respond fairly" to globalizing influences of the time.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have examined the responses of three East Asian countries to the waves of globalization throughout history. In the modern era, all three countries have been mostly inward oriented, hence their primary concerns have been domestic politics and economy. The global forces mostly traveled through one-way channels during the premodern period. The global flow of things usually came to China first, then reached Japan by way of Korea or directly from China.

Sometimes they originated from China and reached other parts of the world as well as Korea and Japan.

Political leaders in the three countries sometimes regarded impacts of globalization as welcome gifts, while at other times they attempted to resist them. In particular, the Koreans and Japanese were often receptive to ideologies and culture from China. But it should be stressed that they did not simply absorb the global religions, ideologies, and value systems. Rather, they often selectively adapted and modified them in accordance with their needs and local traditions. Since the early modern era, the pattern of globalization has become more persistent, compulsory, aggressive, and often antagonistic.

Moreover, Japan is no longer merely a receiver of global gifts from China or Korea. It has become an important contributor to the global flow of things, just as China was during the premodern period. To resist or accommodate the new global values—namely modernization, nationalism, and communism—political leaders in East Asia have had to build a nation and a state out of their own domains. It was a process of resistance, selection, imitation, localization, counterblow, and, ultimately, "glocalization."

As of today, the channels of globalization have become more diversified and complicated and, in a sense, reciprocal. We believe that the way the East Asian region "responds in fairness to globalization" will be important for all of humanity. We are hopeful that the resurgence of human and intellectual resources in East Asia—which once had a splendid tradition and made great contributions to humanity—will act as a new alternative foundation for the post-globalized world by interacting with other great traditions everywhere.

Further Thoughts

Civil Society in East Asia

Jim Dator

What does "civil society" mean within an East Asian perspective? To the extent that East Asian societies are based on Confucian traditions, it might seem at first blush that there is no indigenous concept of civil society in the region. As Nosco and Rosemont tell it, the classical Confucian view of the state is quite similar to what Ehrenberg described, above, about Western ancient and medieval times, a "fused state" in which civilization is made possible only by a strong and all-encompassing government from which there is no legitimate separation or independence.

> The discussion of Confucian perspectives on the boundary between civil society and the state . . . is thoroughly speculative, for classical Confucianism never

> envisioned a society inclusive of secular, voluntary associations of the sort suggestive of my understanding of civil society. This kind of society requires not just a sense of the integrity of the individual as an actor capable of negotiating his/her interactions in a responsible and ultimately socially constructive manner (something Confucianism would affirm) but also an acknowledged sphere of privacy granted by the state and society to its individual and corporate members to enable unauthorized voluntary associations, and Confucianism has generally not distinguished between privacy and selfishness in these contexts. (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 337)

The closest classical Confucianism comes to a concept of civil society is in the well-known series of mutual obligations from child to parent upward to the ruler and the ruled. In the family and village/labor community there is a sphere of relations, functionally similar to that of a civil society, but ultimately connected to the emperor, with his Mandate from Heaven at the top.

> Confucianism's five relationships (ruler/subject, parent/child, husband/wife, elder brother/younger brother, and friend/friend) explicitly acknowledge the importance and value of such voluntary and consensual relationships. But it is also abundantly clear that Confucianism gives priority to those relationships that are found within the household, and to those relations in which there is a clear benefactor and beneficiary, since these are the relationships that prepare one for citizenship and train one in goodness. (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 343)

In this regard it is important to note that the word for "human being" in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese is composed of two characters. The first is a kind of stylized picture of a single person (pronounced "*ren*" in Mandarin Chinese, "*in*" in Korean, and "*nin*" in Japanese). The second character means "between" and is pronounced "*jian*" in Chinese, "*k'an*" in Korean, and "*gen*" in Japanese—thus "*renjian,*" "*ink'an,*" and "*ningen.*" But the point is that to be a "human being" in these cultures, even the written language reminds you, you must be with others. You are not alone. Being human is to be among others, performing your assigned, or assumed, roles. As Rosemont puts it,

> If I am the sum of the roles I live, then I am not truly living except when I am in the company of others. As Confucius himself said, "I cannot herd with the birds and beasts. If I do not live in the midst of other persons, how can I live?" While this view may seem strange to us, it is actually straightforward: in order to *be* a friend, neighbor, or lover, for example, I must *have* a friend, neighbor or lover.

(Rosemont, "Commentary and Addenda on Nosco's 'Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government,'" 365)

The classical difference between Western and Eastern political philosophy (and attitudes toward political design) rests in this point. Western (especially American) traditional political philosophy assumes that all humans are evil and self-centered and cannot be fundamentally reformed and certainly not perfected. This point is made throughout *The Federalist Papers* (the seminal document for understanding American political philosophy), but nowhere more vividly than in the following passage from *The Federalist* No. 51.

> But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, *The Federalist,* 337)

Thus though religion and moral education do the best they can to make humans as good as they can be, they can never be trusted with unrestrained political power. It the words of Lord Acton, which have become a cliché (but nonetheless true), "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In creating governance, you must assume evil and self-centeredness, not trust and goodwill. It is only through structural constraints that "good-enough governance" is possible. Structure matters.

In contrast, Nosco points out that "Confucianism fundamentally distrusts such axiomatic propositions in European and North American political culture as the 'rule of law,' instead preferring to foster a sense of self-worth that, it is assumed, will cause individual persons to regard any misconduct as demeaning

and shameful" (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 348).

And yet on closer examination, there may not be as wide a gulf between Eastern and Western political theory as was imagined. In East Asia, to be human does not mean to be free to do whatever you want. It is always to be "between" other humans, performing reciprocally beneficial roles.

> Confucianism does not suggest that, for this reason, individuals are in their solitary conditions self-worthy, as others in [the] European classical liberal tradition have suggested. Where classical European liberalism might argue that individual integrity is akin to an inward capacity of the soul, and that persons thus enjoy an inherent measure of self-worth, Confucianism by contrast is uncompromising in its understanding of human worth as something manifested fundamentally in the context of relationship. (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 348)

This is structure! Perhaps structure that works better than the Federalists' "auxiliary precautions," judging by the low levels of crime in East Asian countries compared to the United States.

Rosemont also shows that in addition to the kinds of "space" mentioned so far, there is good reason to say that support for civil society is exemplified by Confucianism itself: "Now if it is free, autonomous individuals who come together in voluntary association—and thus form civil society, it follows that there will not be any voluntary associations of this kind in early Confucian thought (although there were some in practice)" (Rosemont, "Commentary and Addenda," 361). "There were such voluntary associations, one of which is clearly reflected in the *Analects* itself: the association of Confucius and his disciples, who lived, studied, worked, and traveled together. After his death, at least three of the disciples formed associations of their own, as did several of these disciples in turn" (Rosemont, "Commentary and Addenda," 363). Thus Confucianism itself suggests that a kind of civil society existed even in early times.

So far, the discussion has mainly focused on the original Confucian tradition in China from AD 220 until 960. After that, the situation becomes more complex, with varying forms of neo-Confucianism developing in China, Korea, and Japan.

> Historically, however, as societies in East Asia acquired the conditions of early modernity, a kind of "space" did indeed open between the state and the citizen, Confucian misgivings towards such space notwithstanding.
>
> The factors responsible for this development are not unlike those identified

> with comparable developments in Europe: increased urbanization, with individuals uprooted from traditional village communities, and endeavoring to create new forms of association to combat the anomie and alienation that accompany such changes; an expansion of surplus wealth and the market, with an ever-increasing volume of transactions, including the commodification of a broad range of cultural products; a developed communication and transportation infrastructure, which contributes to the spread of literacy throughout the society, as well as increased opportunities for personal travel; and in religion, one observes the rise of "protestant" movements in East Asia, as in Europe, such as the Pure Land denominations of Buddhism, which privilege the individual's capacity to negotiate salvation on the basis of personal faith, and which at least conceptually diminish the role of the *ecclesia* as a mediating agency in this process. (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 339)

John Duncan describes the situation in Korea the following way.

> [W]e can see that just as anti-Confucianism has been used by a wide variety of people for what are often diametrically opposite purposes, so, too, has pro-Confucianism been used by different groups and individuals for mutually contradictory goals. In some cases, . . . this may mean nothing more than the cynical manipulation of Confucian values for crass political purposes. But in other instances, such as those . . . who criticized one strand of Confucian learning while upholding others, it hints at the richness of the Confucian tradition, which included many different schools and many competing ideas about how best to order society. In short, what we call Confucianism is complex, difficult to define, and subject to appropriation for a wide range of political and social purposes. (Duncan, "The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism," 41)

In "Civil Society in East and West," Bruce Cumings points out that some American scholars are quite critical of civil society in the United States today, saying it is but a sham and shadow of what it once was, Robert Putnam's famous *Bowling Alone* being the most well-known. At the same time, there is a strand of American scholarship that praises the West, and especially the United States, as the pinnacle of social, economic, and political development, beyond which there can be nothing better. Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* and Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* are prime exhibits. Similarly, there are Western scholars who criticize Asian societies for not being like America or the West generally, Karel van Wolferen's *Enigma of Japanese Power* being Cuming's main example. Cumings writes,

> In this discourse, which is quite common in the US, the ills and pathologies of American civil society curiously disappear, to be replaced surreptitiously by an idealized construction drawn from Locke and Tocqueville. Of course no one can claim that East Asian countries have the social pathology obvious on almost any street in any American city, and recent elections in Korea and Taiwan had rates of voter turnout and exuberant participation far above those of American elections. But all that is forgotten in the conjuring of a Western civil society where well-informed citizens debate the important questions of politics and the good life without fear or favor, in contrast to the limited democracies, authoritarian systems and general illiberalism of East Asia, with the People's Republics in China and North Korea taking the cake as the worst-case outcomes of the pathologies of Asian politics. (Cumings, "Civil Society in East and West," 14)

Cumings further argues that using Anglo-American/French history as the best or only model of the pathway to economic and political "development" and thence to "civil society" is misleading, especially in the case of East Asia. He argues that Germany is the better example.

> The Germans invented the fused state not to solve the problems of liberty, equality, and fraternity at the dawn of the industrial epoch, but to solve the mid-nineteenth century problems of the second industrial revolution and, more importantly, to catch up with England. A fused state is one that both subsumes civil society, and tries to build it up, but not if these efforts get in the way of industrialization.
>
> Here, in short, is a political theory of late development that put off to a distant future the magnificent obsession of the Anglo-Saxon early industrializers with questions of popular will, democratic representation, public vs. private, or state vs. civil society. It is also a theory that explains much about East Asia's democratic trajectory: Japan, a democracy after 1945 but only after the cataclysm of war and occupation; South Korea, a democracy in 1993 but only after the cataclysm of revolution, war, division, and decades of military dictatorship (1961–1987) and sharp political struggle; Taiwan, a democracy in 1996 but only after a revolution, war, national division, and forty years of martial law (1947–1987). . . .
>
> We had the fused state in South Korea and Taiwan, and now we have a limited form of procedural democracy—just like Japan and Germany. But the path to this end was hardly smooth: instead it was filled with decades of torment and turmoil, *Sturm und Drang*, and then—and only then—democracy. (Cumings, "Civil Society in East and West," 25)

Nosco shows that during the last decades of the seventeenth century and first decades of the eighteenth, Tokugawa Japan was under the influence of a liberal kind of Confucianism during which civil society flourished. Shogun Tsunayoshi "sponsored debates among various schools of Confucianism, and even lectured on the classics before assembled audiences of feudal lords and scholars" (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 341). A wide variety of unofficial cultural forms were permitted as long as they did nothing to disturb the peace. So, for example, "the government . . . showed itself to be utterly unconcerned about either Kabuki staging or the content of its repertoire" (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 342). However, toward the end of the eighteenth century, Matsudaira Sadanobu introduced a severely puritanical form of Confucianism that censored the same activities that had been supported, or permitted, a few decades earlier (Nosco, "Confucian Perspectives on Civil Society and Government," 346f).

In Japan's case as well, from the Meiji Restoration onward, in spite of some occasional liberal periods, the sphere of civil society in Japan was comparatively restricted. As Keiko Hirata explains, "The developmental state paid little attention to noneconomic affairs in the realm of civil society, such as respect for individuals' rights, since the state's primary goal was rapid economic development. . . . To maintain state control to promote economic growth, the developmental state regulated civil society activities by imposing strict legal restrictions on citizens' associations" (Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan,* 22).

However, things are different now.

> The developmental state, which brought about spectacular economic success in Japan, was eventually eroded by two very powerful forces. One of these was internal, a maturation of industrialization that weakened the need for a developmental system. The second was external, a process of globalization that brought powerful new external forces to bear on Japan's political economy society and culture. Together these factors have contributed to profound structural and normative changes in Japan, contributing to the rise of Japanese civil society. (Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan,* 26)

Notes

1. Prince Shōtoku became regent under the Empress Suiko, his mother, who was a daughter of the Soga. Prince Shōtoku was said to be extremely gifted, but some historians argue that he did not exist at all.

2. Neo-Confucianism was developed in the twelfth century by Zhu Xi, who synthesized Taoist cosmology and Buddhist spirituality with the core Confucian values. Neo-Confucianism became a dominant ideology in the intellectual and spiritual life of East Asian literati in the premodern period.

3. See Sohn Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup, *The History of Korea* (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 1984).

4. P. H. P. Mason and J. G. Caiger, *A History of Japan* (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 1997), 65. The court moved its capital from Heijokyo in Nara to Heiankyo in Kyoto in 794. The Heian period begins with this capital transformation. Both capitals were designed according to the Chinese style. However, many temples and other constructions in Heiankyo represent Japanese traits, while those in Heijokyo embody Chinese styles.

5. "Wang Yangming" in Chinese characters is pronounced "Ōyōmei" in Japanese.

6. Details available at www.chaplaincare.navy.mil/Islam.htm.

7. Soo-Il Jung, "Exploring 1200 Years of Korea and Islam Interchange," *Sindonga* (May 2001): 424.

8. Yusuf Abdul Rahman, available at www.islamic-world.net/islamic-state/islam_in_china.htm.

9. Ibid.

10. Jung, "Exploring 1200 years of Korea and Islam Interchange," 425–426.

11. Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

12. Samuel H. Moffett, *A History of Christianity in Asia* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1998).

13. Jenkins, *The Next Christendom,* 23.

14. Andrew E. Kim, "History of Christianity in Korea: From Its Troubled Beginning to Its Contemporary Success," available at www.kimsoft.com/1997/xhist.htm.

15. Ibid.

16. Quoted in Moffett, *A History of Christianity in Asia,* 503–509.

17. Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

18. Ming-fong Kuo and Andreas Weiland, "Modern Literature in Post-War Taiwan," *Intercultural Studies* no. 1 (Spring 2003). Available at www.intercultural-studies.org/ICSI/Kuo.htm.

19. Belief in the cultural superiority of Chinese civilization and that they are the center of the world.

20. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 612.

21. Kuo and Weiland, "Modern Literature in Post-War Taiwan." Available at www.intercultural-studies.org/ICSI/Kuo.htm.

22. D. Eleanor Westney, *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

23. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), chap. 2.

24. Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1985); and Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

25. Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Nobuyuki Yoshida, *Seijukusuru Edo: Nihon no rekishi,* vol. 17 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002).

26. Carter J. Eckert et al., eds., *Korea, Old and New: A History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 203–204.

27. Although the West was conceived as the most advanced and civilized entity, the Korean reformists were greatly influenced by the idea of "the Japanese Imperial Pan-Asian Alliance" against the threats from the West and believed that this was the best way eventually to catch up with the West.

28. Eckert et al., eds., *Korea, Old and New,* 210.

29. Ibid., 210–211.

30. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagine Community: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

31. Ibid., 5–6.

32. Although there was a traditional Chinese concept of state, it was primarily based upon the "Middle Kingdom Principle." The Chinese saw the state *(kwuo)* as a "cultural community" rather than as a sovereign entity.

33. John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996).

34. Ibid.

35. After the 1911 Revolution, the official definition of "Chinese" was expanded to include non-Han ethnicities.

36. The May Fourth Movement is the name given to the student demonstrations against the Paris Peace Conference's decision to hand over former German concessions in the Shantung Province to Japan instead of China.

37. Available at Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org.

38. Schwartz suggests that communism outside the Soviet Union did not follow the blueprints for revolution as designed by Marx, nor was there a master plan determined by the Comintern. Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).

39. Throughout the Japanese colonial period, Tonghak played a significant role in maintaining the nationalistic consciousness, such as the mass demonstration of March 1, 1919.

40. Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895–1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 11.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Kim Jong Il, *On the Juche Idea* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), 41.

44. Ibid., 38.

45. Along with Confucianism, the Christian tradition was quite strong in the northern region of the Korean peninsula prior to 1945.

46. Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).

47. Noguchi Yukio, *1940-nen Taisei: Saraba "Senji Keizai"* (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1995).

48. Kuo and Weiland, "Modern Literature in Post-War Taiwan." Available at www.intercultural-studies.org/ICSI/Kuo.htm.