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RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

Resource mobilization theory has recently presented an alternative interpretation of social movements. The review traces the emergence and recent controversies generated by this new perspective. A multifactored model of social movement formation is advanced, emphasizing resources, organization, and political opportunities in addition to traditional discontent hypotheses. The McCarthy-Zald (1973) theory of entrepreneurial mobilization is critically assessed as an interpretation of the social movements of the 1960s–1970s, and the relevance of the Olson (1968) theory of collective action is specified. Group organization is argued to be the major determinant of mobilization potential and patterns. The debate between the Gerlach-Hine (1970) and entrepreneurial theories of social movement organization is traced in terms of historical changes in the social movement sector and the persistence of organizational diversity. A model of social movement politics is outlined, building on Gamson's (1975) theory of strategy and Tilly's (1978) polity theory by emphasizing political alliances and processes shaping success and failure. Piven & Cloward (1977) are correct that disruptiveness leads to success and that disruptions can be mobilized without formal organization; they are wrong in asserting that formal organization is necessarily incompatible with mobilization. The future development of resource mobilization theory lies in two directions: extending the polity theory to deal with different states and regimes, including the development of neo-corporatism, and providing a more sophisticated social psychology of mobilization.

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THE EMERGENCE OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

Of the wide-ranging effects that the social movements of the 1960s had on sociology, one of the more significant was the reorientation of the study of social movements. Traditionally the central problem in the field had been explaining individual participation in social movements. The major formulations—mass society theory, relative deprivation, collective behavior theory—pointed to sudden increases in individual grievances generated by the "structural strains" of rapid social change. While specific hypotheses varied, these traditional theories shared the assumptions that movement participation was relatively rare, discontents were transitory, movement and institutionalized actions were sharply distinct, and movement actors were arational if not outright irrational. The movements of the 1960s dramatically challenged these assumptions. By providing a rich array of experience and enlisting the active sympathies of an enlarged pool of analysts, the movements stimulated a shift in theoretical assumptions and analytic emphases that eventually became formalized in the resource mobilization theory of social movements (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1981) and closely allied neo-Marxian formulations (Useem 1975; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven & Cloward 1977). These new perspectives emphasized the continuities between movement and institutionalized actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change. In specific, these analysts argued that: *(a)* movement actions are rational, adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action; *(b)* the basic goals of movements are defined by conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations; *(c)* the grievances generated by such conflicts are sufficiently ubiquitous that the formation and mobilization of movements depend on changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action; *(d)* centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more typical of modern social movements and more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures; and *(e)* the success of movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political processes in which they become enmeshed.

These new perspectives have, in turn, stimulated a series of critiques, ranging from debates among resource mobilization theorists over the usefulness of particular formulations (Perrow 1979) to arguments by collective behavior theorists that the new perspectives are either not as distinctive as their proponents claim or rest on too narrow a theoretical framework (Turner 1982; Gusfield 1982; Zurcher & Snow 1981). This review draws on these debates and recent empirical studies to outline the basic arguments of resource mobilization

theory and to assess critically the contribution of the theory to the major issues in the field: the formation of movements, the process of mobilization, the organization of social movements, and the outcome of challenges.

SOURCES OF CONTENTION: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION VS TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The clash between resource mobilization theory and traditional approaches, especially collective behavior theories, has stemmed in large part from different conceptions of social movements. Traditional definitions have included any set of noninstitutionalized collective actions consciously oriented towards social change (or resisting such changes) and possessing a minimum of organization (Wilkinson 1971:27; Turner & Killian 1972:246). Social movements are traditionally seen as extensions of more elementary forms of collective behavior and as encompassing both movements of personal change (e.g. religious sects, cults, and communes) and those focused on institutional changes (e.g. legal reforms and changes in political power). Resource mobilization theorists have, in contrast, seen social movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to movements of institutional change that attempt to alter "elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society" (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1218), organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson 1975:16–18), or represent the interests of groups excluded from the polity (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978, 1979).

Most of the disputes in the field flow from this difference. Institutional change movements tend to conform to the basic resource mobilization model: rational actions oriented towards clearly defined, fixed goals with centralized organizational control over resources and clearly demarcated outcomes that can be evaluated in terms of tangible gains. The premise that social movements are extensions of institutionalized actions is also plausible. The problem arises, however, in applying this model to movements of personal change in which expressive actions are intertwined with rational-instrumental actions. In such movements, goals tend to arise out of interaction; centralized control is tied to a charismatic leader or is weak; outcomes are diffuse. Continuities between these movements and elementary collective behavior are more apparent.

Given this bifuraction, how can the field develop? One direction is to apply resource mobilization models to the organizational aspects of personal change movements. Recent work by Lofland (1977, 1979), Shupe & Bromley (1979), Liebman (1983), and Hadden & Swan (1981) on religious movement organizations and by Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson (1980) on micro-structures of recruitment have already demonstrated the usefulness of resource mobilization models in studying personal change movements. More problematic is the

analysis of personal and cultural change in resource mobilization terms. Traditionally resource mobilization theory has been posed in terms of collective actors struggling for power in an institutional context. Microlevel processes have been ignored or treated as simplifying assumptions for a larger-scale analysis (e.g. the rational actor premise; cf. Tilly 1978:119). Gamson, Fireman & Rytina (1982) have provided a start by analyzing micro-mobilization in terms of actions that give rise to rebellion, while Granovetter (1978) has analyzed the logic of collective decision-making. These analyses, however, have not yet been extended to deal with personality transformation or cultural change. In view of the generally limited success of sociologists in dealing with the links between micro- and macro-processes (Collins 1981), this will likely remain a problem in the future.

THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The sine qua non of the study of social movements has traditionally been the question of why movements form. Traditional explanations have emphasized sudden increases in short-term grievances created by the "structural strains" of rapid social change (Gusfield 1968). In contrast, resource mobilization theorists have argued that grievances are secondary. Tilly (1978), Jenkins & Perrow (1977), and Oberschall (1978a) have argued that grievances are relatively constant, deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions, and that movements form because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action. While grievances are necessary for movement formation, they are explained either by changes in power relations (Korpi 1974) or by structural conflicts of interest. McCarthy & Zald (1973, 1977) have taken a slightly different direction, arguing for an entrepreneurial theory of movement formation in which the major factor is the availability of resources, especially cadres and organizing facilities. Grievances are either structurally given or, increasingly in the contemporary setting, manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs. As McCarthy & Zald formulate it, "the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel available" (1973:13).

The debate touched off by these formulations, especially the McCarthy-Zald version, has produced support for both formulations as well as a refined theory of grievances. The strongest support for the McCarthy-Zald theory has come from studies of the "public interest" movement that came to prominence in the 1970s. Berry's (1977:17–27) survey of public interest organizations found that the majority were formed by energetic entrepreneurs acting without significant increases in grievances. Likewise, Schoefield, Meier & Griffin (1979), Simcock (1979), and Wood (1982) have traced the emergence of the environmental movement to a handful of natural scientist and policy researchers who rede-

fined traditional conservationist concerns in ecological terms and mobilized institutional resources. These movements pursued goals linked to the interests of broad, diffuse, disorganized collectivities such as the general public or middle-class consumers who were unlikely to mobilize without the initiative of entrepreneurs.

The entrepreneurial model has also received support from movements of deprived groups such as farm workers (Jenkins & Perrow 1977) and welfare recipients (Bailis 1974; Jackson & Johnson 1974). In these cases, the entrepreneurs had branched out after being cadres in the civil rights and student movements. Both were also centered among deprived groups with few resources, minimal political experience, and little prior organization, making outside organizers critical in the formation of a movement. In fact, such cadre diversification was also critical in launching a wide array of movements among less deprived groups such as women's liberation (Freeman 1973; Evans 1979; Tierney 1982), radical ecology (Wood 1982), and neighborhood and general citizen organizing (Kotz & Kotz 1977; Boyte 1979). In other words, the entrepreneurial model appears most relevant for movements among deprived groups and broad disorganized collectivities. The entrepreneurs are typically generated by the factionalization of previous movements. Significantly, however, major movements do not appear to emerge from the de novo manufacture of grievances by entrepreneurs. As McCarthy & Zald (1973:28) argue, entrepreneurs are more successful by seizing on major interest cleavages and redefining long-standing grievances in new terms.

Recent studies have also demonstrated the significance of increased grievances generated by sudden and major threats to the interests of cohesive and moderately resourceful groups. Useem's (1980) study of the antibusing countermovement in Boston found that relative deprivation created by elite challenges to traditional privileges was significant in explaining participation independent of solidarity levels. While the grievance measures were *post factum,* Walsh's (1981) study of protest groups contesting the reopening of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant has confirmed the importance of crises generated by elite actions. Antinuclear organizations had previously failed to mobilize citizens against the plant until the disaster. Significantly, support came overwhelmingly from middle- and upper-middle class residents who were politically active and highly involved in extralocal community organizations. In other words, "crisis" formation presupposes the existence of resourceful, organized groups. Typically the "crisis" is created by elite actions that threaten a population's way of life and thereby violate institutionalized conceptions of elite responsibilities (Moore 1978).

Studies have also confirmed the argument that long-term changes in the organization, resources, and opportunities of groups give rise to movement formation. Industrial conflicts are more likely among ecologically concentrated

workers in large factories and densely populated urban neighborhoods (Lodhi & Tilly 1973; Shorter & Tilly 1974:287–95; Foster 1974; Lincoln 1978). Likewise, the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1950s stemmed from the urbanization of the southern black population, increased numbers of middle-class and working-class blacks, growing black college enrollments, and the organizational expansion of black churches. These changes simultaneously freed blacks from traditional paternalistic social controls, increased levels of black organization and resources, and placed the black voter in a strategic location in national politics (W. J. Wilson 1973:140–51; Piven & Cloward 1977:189–94; Morris 1980; McAdam 1982). Similarly, Ragin (1979) and Nielsen (1980) have argued that ethnic separatist movements in Western Europe have emerged because of declining status inequalities, especially increases in the resources and ecological concentration of minority groups facilitating their competition for social rewards. In the same vein, sudden increases in the opportunities for cohesive, aggrieved groups can lead to the formation of movements. Large-scale peasant rebellions have typically emerged after the coercive capacity of the state has collapsed, leaving cohesive villages free to act on long-standing grievances (Skocpol 1979). In general, the formation of movements is linked to improvements in the status of aggrieved groups, not because of grievances created by the "revolution of rising expectations" but because these changes reduce the costs of mobilization and improve the likelihood of success.

These studies have also indicated the need for a multifactored approach to the problem of movement formation. Movements are formed through diverse routes depending on the elements absent in the premovement situation. Gamson, Fireman & Rytina (1982:82–93) have provided a suggestive formulation arguing for a "threshold" model of resources. Beyond this threshold additional resources make little difference. Presumably the same applies to grievances, organization and opportunities. Each factor must be present at its threshold level before a movement emerges. At the same time, deficits in some dimensions (e.g. group organization) might be offset by surpluses on other dimensions (e.g. experienced organizers). In general, a multifactored approach is more useful than McCarthy & Zald's exclusive emphasis on organizational resources. At the same time, the classic "structural strain" theories of grievances have been less useful than an approach emphasizing structural conflicts of interest.

THE PROCESS OF MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action. The major issues, therefore, are the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts, the processes

by which the group pools resources and directs these towards social change, and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources.

Little agreement exists on the types of resources that are significant. Several analysts have offered classificatory schemes based upon the usefulness of particular resources in controlling the actions of targets (e.g. Etzioni 1968:388–89; Gamson 1968:100–5). In this vein, Rogers (1974) has distinguished *instrumental* resources used in actual influence attempts from *infra*-resources that condition the use of instrumental resources. Similarly, Jenkins (1982a) has distinguished *power* resources that provide the means for controlling the actions of targets from *mobilizing* resources such as facilities that provide for mobilizing power resources.

The problem with schemes based on uses, however, is that most resources have multiple uses. Any scheme that ignores the intrinsic features of resources is therefore of limited value. In response, most analysts have simply listed the assets that are frequently mobilized by movements [e.g. McCarthy & Zald's (1977) money, facilities, labor, and legitimacy; or Tilly's (1978:69) land, labor, capital, and technical expertise]. Freeman (1979:172–5) has offered a more useful scheme, distinguishing *tangible* assets such as money, facilities, and means of communication from the *intangible* or "human" assets that form the central basis for movements. Intangible assets include both specialized resources such as organizing and legal skills, and the unspecialized labor of supporters.

The most distinctive contribution of resource mobilization theory has been to emphasize the significance of outside contributions and the cooptation of institutional resources by contemporary social movements. Traditionally, analysts have assumed that resources come from the direct beneficiaries of the social changes pursued and that, since movements lie outside institutionalized politics, they derive their resources from noninstitutional sources. McCarthy & Zald (1973, 1977), however, have argued that the movements of the 1960s and 1970s mobilized a "conscience constituency" of the wealthy and the affluent middle class (including college students) and coopted institutional resources from private foundations, social welfare institutions, the mass media, universities, governmental agencies, and even business corporations. Social movements have therefore shifted from classical social movement organizations (or classical SMOs) with indigenous leadership, volunteer staff, extensive membership, resources from direct beneficiaries, and actions based on mass participation, towards professional social movement organizations (or professional SMOs) with outside leadership, full time paid staff, small or nonexistent membership, resources from conscience constituencies, and actions that "speak for" rather than involve an aggrieved group.

This portrait of recent social movements has been challenged on several points. The general thesis is that these movements did not arise from a genuine

"participation revolution" in American politics but merely reflected improved facilitative conditions for professionalized mobilization. Professionals and college students with discretionary time schedules and income, liberal institutions with "slack" resources, and pervasive mass media that could be coopted by enterprising movement entrepreneurs were the major factors behind the stormy 1960s. Evidence on political trends, however, indicates a virtual explosion of unconventional mass political participation between 1960 and 1974. Figure 1 shows that the number of protest demonstrations and riots escalated dramatically, peaking in the 1967–1972 period. This "participation revolution" was, in turn, undergirded by a general increase in the mobilization for unconventional politics as the number of political ideologues increased from 1% of the citizenry in the 1950s to 19% in 1972, then declining to 7% in 1976 (Nie, Verba & Petrocik 1980:367), membership in political organizations expanded from 2.8% in 1956 to a peak of 4.4% in 1974 (Survey Research Center & Davis et al 1981), and political activists involved in nonelectoral activity rose from 5–12% in the 1950s to 15–20% in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Campbell et al 1960:51–2; Converse 1972:332–6; Rosenau 1974:44–86; Milbrath & Goel 1977:18–19). Simultaneously, mobilization for routine politics declined as voter turnout slowly declined, partisan independence rose, and general distrust of elected officials and major institutions



Figure 1 Demonstrations and riots in the United States, 1948-1977. (From Taylor & Jodice 1983)

steadily increased (Ladd & Hadley 1978; Miller, Miller & Schneider 1980: 257–9).

While McCarthy & Zald are correct that professional SMOs and the cooptation of institutional resources increased in the 1960s, these features hardly explain the mobilization of generalized political turmoil in that period. Most of the movements were not professional SMOs and did not rely on external resources for their crucial victories. Contributors of external resources were largely reactive, not initiatory, and were not consistently beneficial. The civil rights movement was indigenously lead by black clergy and students, mobilized resources chiefly through local community networks, and tapped "conscience constituents" only after generalized turmoil had has already been mobilized (Morris 1980, 1981; McAdam 1982). Moreover, most of the external resources were mobilized by the moderate wing of the movement after it had successfully entered the polity and begun institutionalizing the gains of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Ironically, the militant wing was more dependent on external resources and, partially because of conflicts over the use of these resources, became increasingly radical, eventually turning against their "conscience constituents" and destroying the organizations (Meier & Rudwick 1973; Carson 1981). Nor is the McCarthy-Zald theory fully satisfactory in explaining the middle-class and student involvement in the various movements of the 1960s. By focusing exclusively on economic changes that facilitated involvement (discretionary income and time schedules, social reform careers, institutional "slack"), the theory ignores changing cultural values and elite actions that led to an interest in movement politics. The middle-class "participation revolution" was rooted in the shift towards "postmaterialist" values emphasizing self-fulfillment that supported demands for direct participation in political decisions and moral concern for the plight of others (Ladd & Hadley 1978; Yankelovich 1974, 1981; Ingelhart 1977). When elites challenged these values by manipulative acts and outright rejection, the middle class rallied around the movements.

The McCarthy-Zald theory does, however, identify significant aspects of recent social movements. The student and antiwar movements did rely heavily on the mobilization of transitory teams through coopting the mass media (Oberschall 1978; Gitlin 1980). Additionally, the welfare rights movement (Bailis 1974; West 1981), farm worker movement (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1983), and "older wing" of the women's movement (Freeman 1975) were initiated by movement entrepreneurs who relied heavily on institutional resources. Moreover, the environmental, consumer rights and general "public interest" movements of the 1970s have fit the professional SMO model quite closely (McFarland 1976; Berry 1977; Handler 1978; Weisbrod, Handler & Komesar 1978). Finally, professional SMOs such as Mobilization for Youth (Helfgot 1981) and the Community Action Program (Greenstone & Peterson

1977; Friedland 1980) did function as social control devices, "diffusing the radical possibilities of dissent . . . by applying large amounts of resources . . . in ameliorative directions" (McCarthy & Zald 1973:26).

If direct beneficiaries have been the major contributors to recent movements, how have they been mobilized? Because of its rationalistic assumptions, the major debate has been over the usefulness of Mancur Olson's (1968) theory of collective action. According to Olson, rational self-interested individuals will not contribute to securing "collective goods" (i.e. nonexcludable benefits) because of the superior rationality of "riding free". Mobilization occurs only if "selective benefits" (i.e. distinct divisible benefits) are offered, the group is sufficiently small that benefits to individuals are greater than the costs of securing the collective good, or the group is "privileged" (i.e. contains individuals sufficiently endowed that the marginal costs of securing the collective good are less than their individual benefit).

All three of Olson's solutions to the problem of collective goods have come under critical attack. The major target has been the "by-product" theory of mobilization based on selective incentives. According to the theory, movement entrepreneurs motivated by the selective incentives of career opportunities offer selective incentives to members for their contributions, creating an expanding cycle of collective actions and further mobilization (Salisbury 1969; Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Young 1971; Oberschall 1973:146–72). The major challenge has centered on the prominence of moral or purposive incentives. Tillock & Morrison (1979) found that members of Zero Population Growth claimed overwhelmingly that a moral commitment to the collective good of population control was their sole motive for support. Moreover, contributions did not vary as a function of the size of chapter membership, casting doubt on the small-group hypothesis. While opinion surveys are a weak method for assessing motives, studies of environmental and public interest organizations by Mitchell (1980) and Berry (1977:36–43) have provided further support against the "by-product" theory. Selective incentives such as membership services and social events are rarely utilized and, in opinion surveys, contributors consistently claim that these are irrelevant to their support. A clue is provided by the framing of membership appeals. Movement entrepreneurs have consistently posed their appeals in terms of "collective evils" such as massive ecological dangers and violations of human rights. Moralistic concerns are clearly uppermost. Moreover, in such a "no-exit" situation, the distinction between individual and collective benefits is obliterated (Hirschman 1970). However, these studies refute only the stronger version of the free-rider hypothesis—namely, that no one will contribute to the collective good in the absence of selective benefits (Brubaker 1975). Moreover, these studies have examined only contributors, ignoring the far greater number of noncontributors who will also benefit from the collective good.

What about the weaker version of the free-rider hypothesis—that contributions will be suboptimal in the absence of selective incentives (Samuelson 1954)? In a series of experiments, Marwell & Ames (1979, 1980) have subjected this version to critical scrutiny, finding consistently that over half of all participants have contributed to the collective good without selective incentives. Variations in personal resources, pay off levels, and prior experience did not significantly affect contribution rates. However, group size was significant, smaller groups contributing at higher rates. Whether this was because of greater ease in coordination or due to Olson's small-group effect was unclear. While the isomorphism between experiments and natural settings is never perfect, these were sufficiently realistic that the high levels of contributions cast serious doubt on the free-rider hypothesis. In fact, Marwell (1981) has subsequently posited an intrinsic altruism reinforced by face-to-face interaction.

The Olson theory, however, cannot be dismissed. One case that supports it is the National Welfare Rights Organization experience (Bailis 1974). The NWRO was initiated by professional organizers who used the selective incentive of assistance in securing special cash benefits to mobilize welfare recipients. When organizers shifted to nonmaterial incentives, few prospective members were receptive. In line with Olson's theory, as soon as members learned how to secure the welfare benefits for themselves, contributions to the NWRO trailed off, leaving behind a core of activists motivated largely by the selective benefits of social recognition. When welfare administrators abolished the cash benefit program, the NWRO virtually collapsed.

The Olson theory correctly identifies a major problem but fails to offer an adequate solution. Olson is correct that movements cannot be mobilized around collective material benefits and that free-riding is potentially a major problem. The strongest evidence comes from Walsh & Warland's (1982) study of residents surrounding the Three Mile Island nuclear plant disaster. Free-riding was pervasive; only 13% of those opposed to the restart contributed. Free-riding was largely due to ignorance and calculations of personal interest. Almost half (48%) of the free-riders were unaware of the oppostion effort or had not been contacted by movement organizers. The remainder cited personal constraints (24%), distaste for protest tactics and movement leaders (11%), or pessimism about their own political efficacy (5%). In other words, free-riding is probably widespread in natural settings and, while organizing efforts can reduce its frequency, personal calculations of costs and rewards are significant considerations.

How, then, do successful movements overcome the problem? The major method is the development of programs that offer the *collective incentives* of group solidarity and commitment to moral purpose (J. Wilson 1973; Gamson & Fireman 1979; Moe 1980; Jenkins 1982a). Group solidarity and purposive incentives are collective in that they entail the fusion of personal and collective

interests. Movement supporters, like all socialized actors, act in terms of internalized values and sentiments as well as calculations of self-interest. The major task in mobilization, then, is to generate solidarity and moral commitments to the broad collectivities in whose name movements act.

The mobilization potential of a group is largely determined by the degree of preexisting group organization. Groups sharing strong distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks exclusive to group members are highly organized and hence readily mobilized (Tilly 1978:62–3). By providing prior solidarities and moral commitments, these identities and networks provide a basis for the operation of collective incentives. The "bloc recruitment" (Oberschall 1973: 125) of preexisting solidary groups is the most efficient form of recruitment and appears to be typical of large-scale institutional change movements (Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson 1980). Conversely, groups with weak identities, few intragroup networks, and strong ties to outsiders are less likely to mobilize. As Foster (1974) found among English industrial workers, communities with strong intraclass networks based on intermarriage and involvement in recreational activities mobilized more readily and more extensively than those with weak networks and/or strong ties outside of their class. Similarly, Jenkins (1982a) found that seasonal farm workers who were immune to the paternalistic ties of their employers and enmeshed in cohesive work and kinship networks were more readily mobilized than either migrants who lacked intragroup ties or permanent hands who were subject to employer controls.

Recruitment strategies follow the same basic principles. Campaigns centered around purposive and solidary incentives, focused on preexisting or "natural" groups, and linking the vision of change to the preexisting group culture are more effective. Farm worker unions that emphasized "bread and butter" gains were less successful than those that organized solidary events and inaugurated ideological training programs (Jenkins 1982a). Similarly, individual recruitment requires greater resource investments and is much slower than bloc recruitment (Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson 1980; Jenkins 1982a). Likewise, organizers who draw on the cultural symbols of the target population are more sucessful than those emphasizing abstract ideologies (Brill 1971).

Differential recruitment follows essentially the same outlines. Recruitment tends to select individuals who are more enmeshed in interpersonal networks (Pinard 1971; Leahy & Mazur 1978; Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson 1980), active in political

Pinard 1971; Barnes & Kaase 1979; E. J. Walsh, R. H. Warland, unpublished paper), ideologically committed to social change (Bolton 1972; Fendrich 1974), and structurally available for participation (Orum 1972; Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson 1980). Differential recruitment also changes as movements expand. Early recruits to the student movement came from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, attended elite universities, were more active in political

organizations, and were more committed to social change ideologies than later recruits (Lipset 1971:81–8; Wood 1974). Likewise, social classes appear to respond to different incentives. In general, more secure middle- and upper-class groups are more receptive to purposive incentives, while less secure, lower-class groups respond to selective incentives and collective solidarity (J. Wilson 1973:72–73). Similarly, differential participation tends to follow receptiveness to different incentives. Oliver (1982) found that full-time cadres in the neighborhood movement were more ideologically committed, while transitory activists were more concerned about personal benefits. In other words, the monetary rewards that professional staff receive are probably secondary to ideological concern as their low salary levels suggest.

Note that the preceding discussion has ignored the major emphasis in classic studies of differential recruitment—namely, the role of personality characteristics. While personality differences undoubtedly play a role in differential recruitment, existing studies have been inconclusive as to which personality traits are significant and, more importantly, have been methodologically unable to demonstrate that these traits are independent of the social characteristics that lead to differential recruitment and participation.

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The major debate over the organization of movements has been between proponents of a centralized bureaucratic model (Gamson 1975; McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977) and those arguing for a decentralized informal model (Gerlach & Hine 1970). The former argue that a formalized structure with a clear division of the labor maximizes mobilization by transforming diffuse commitments into clearly defined roles and that a centralized decision-making structure increases combat readiness by reducing internal conflicts (Gamson 1975: 89–109). In contrast, Gerlach & Hine (1970:34–56) have argued that decentralized movements with a minimum division of labor and integrated by informal networks and an overarching ideology are more effective. A segmented, decentralized structure maximizes mobilization by providing extensive interpersonal bonds that generate solidarity and reinforce ideological commitments. In addition, such a structure is highly adaptive, encouraging tactical experimentation, competition among subgroups, and lessened vulnerability to suppression or cooptation by authorities.

This debate, however, has been seriously derailed by several misinterpretations. Some analysts (especially Gerlach & Hine) have assumed that the debate centers around identifying the single typical form of movement organization. As Zald & Ash (1966) argued sometime ago, movements adopt different forms depending on their goals. Personal change movements tend to adopt decentralized structures and exclusive membership rules while institutional change movements are typically centralized and inclusive (Curtis & Zurcher 1974).

Moreover, analysts have ignored the distinction between social movements (or SMs) defined by broad goals and/or interests, and social movement organizations (or SMOs) defined by particular organizational structures. Since social movements are typically characterized by multiple SMOs, a multi-organizational model allowing the coexistence of diverse types is generally more appropriate in gauging the organization of a single social movement (Zald & McCarthy 1980). Finally, commentators have often taken these formulations as descriptions rather than ideal-typical extremes. Current research indicates that there are also intermediary forms of SMOs: centralized structures with semi-autonomous locals (e.g. the NAACP, the labor, movement) and antonomous locals loosely coordinated through federative structures (e.g. SCLC, the tenant movement).

The broadest treatment of movement organization has been the analysis of the modernization of collective action by Charles Tilly (1978) and his associates (Shorter & Tilly 1974; Tilly, Tilly & Tilly 1975; Tilly & Tilly 1981). Building on the classic distinction between communal and associational organization, they have documented the broad shift over the past four centuries from short reactive actions by small-scale informal solidary groups (or communities) to long proactive actions mounted by large-scale special purpose associations. The shift broadly conforms to that from decentralized, informally structured communal movements to centralized, formally structured SMOs. The major sources of this shift have been linked to the broad contours of social development. The growth of industrial capitalism and the building of modern states destroyed the autonomy of small solidary groups and forced claimants to compete in a larger national political arena in which large numbers and bureaucratic structures were keys to success. Furthermore, urbanization and the growth of the mass media reduced the costs of large-scale mobilization, making bureaucratized associations more feasible. Finally, the institutionalization of liberal democracy, especially mass electoral participation, furnished an environment well suited to movement organizations that could mobilize large numbers of supporters. As the traditional communal group gave way to the modern bureaucratized association, the goals and forms of action shifted. Communal actors were "instinctive radicals," treating outside intrusions as fundamental violations, while associations were more moderate, maximizing gains within a given political environment (Calhoun 1982). The former adopted a relatively fixed repertoire borrowed from existing structures of authority while the latter were more flexible, experimenting with different forms of action and, at least in liberal democracies, adopting the mass demonstration because of its advantages in signalling numerical support. McCarthy & Zald's (1973, 1977) professional SMO with its reliance on professional staff, external resources, and transitory teams could be viewed as a direct extension of this general trend.

Yet despite this broad shift, decentralized movements have continued to emerge. Often decentralized structures are a product of deliberate choices by redemptive or personal-change movements attempting to embody ideals in the hope that these will serve as models for emulation. The student movement, and SDS in particular, adopted a decentralized "leaderless" model of democratic structure in order to maximize the values of direct participation and communal involvement and to avoid the dangers of oligarchy and cooptation (Breines 1980, 1982; Case & Taylor 1979). Decentralized structures can also evolve from ecological constraints and inherited models. Judkins (1979), for example, has argued that the geographic dispersion and competitive leadership structure of the contemporary movement on behalf of black lung victims have created a decentralized structure more akin to a federation of chapters than the bureaucratized organization that is claimed to exist. Similarly, Freeman (1979) has argued that the two wings of the women's movement developed different structures because of the political experiences, values, reference standards, and target relations inherited from the initial organizers. While both branches possessed similar resources, the "older" branch (NOW, WEAL, NWPC) was organized by women whose experience lay in conventional reform politics and whose values and reference standards emphasized effectiveness in bringing about institutional changes. Bureaucratic structures were adopted because these were familiar means that had been used by the labor and civil rights movements. The "younger" branch, in contrast, emerged out of the late phases of the student movement and therefore emphasized direct participation and personal transformation in preparation for social revolution. Once set, organizational structures channel actions and are relatively immutable. As the prospects for revolution receded, these decentralized structures channelled action towards personal-change activities such as "consciousness raising" and educational/service projects. Despite rhetorical commitments to institutional change, appropriate actions were organizationally blocked by the decentralized structures.

Within a basic framework, the organizational structures of movements can still evolve. Contrary to the classic Weber-Michels theory, however, change is not inevitably in the direction of greater bureaucratization. As the National Organization for Women expanded in the mid-1970s to become the major organization in the women's movement, it became more internally diverse and developed a more decentralized structure composed of special task forces to accommodate the diverse ideologies and interests of its rapidly growing membership (Carden 1978). Similarly, Hertz (1981) has argued that the growth of the welfare rights movement in the late 1960s produced a multi-organizational field of informally coordinated organizations, providing the movement with the advantages of a decentralized structure. While this created strains because of internal competition for resources, decentralization also reduced factionalist

tendencies by allowing activists to pursue diverse concerns. The same could be argued for the multi-organizational civil rights movement during its expansionary phase (McAdam 1982). Likewise, movement organizations can preserve their decentralized communal structures by adopting restrictions on size, using mutual criticism to restrain core activists, remaining economically marginal, relying strictly on internal financing, and attempting to reduce knowledge differentials among participants. (Rothschild-Whitt 1979).

These studies have also underlined Zald & Ash's (1966) classic contention that different organizational structures are effective for different tasks. Bureaucratic structures provide technical expertise and coordination essential in institutional change efforts but are less effective at mobilizing "grass roots" participation. Decentralized structures maximize personal transformation, thereby mobilizing "grass roots" participation and insuring group maintenance, but often at the cost of strategic effectiveness. Movement organizations that attempt to combine incongruent elements therefore confront strategic dilemmas. The antinuclear-power movement, for example, has effectively mobilized "grass roots" support because of its decentralized participatory structures but, despite the adoption of innovative methods for making consensual decisions, the process of consulting numerous "affinity groups" has significantly hindered its strategic effectiveness (Barkan 1979). Similarly, major internal strains in SDS eventually led to organizational collapse in the late 1960s, in part because the decentralized structures were ultimately incompatible with the mass mobilization projects undertaken in opposition to the Vietnam War buildup (Gitlin 1980:133–36, 156–62). In fact, Starr (1979) has argued that this organizational dichotomy is so significant that it accounts for the different fates of the various social movements of the 1960s. "Exemplary" organizations such as communes and co-ops collapsed either because they were introverted and socially isolated or because their decentralized structures blocked large-scale mobilization. At the same time, "adversary" organizations that pursued moderate reforms typically survived and became politically incorporated because their centralized structures enabled them to coopt institutional resources (e.g. the alternative media) or required minimal "grass roots" participation (e.g. community organizations and public interest lobbies).

However, most SMOs probably fall somewhere between the bureaucratic and decentralized models. Potentially this affords the mobilization advantages of decentralization as well as the tactical ones of centralization. Moreover, most social movements contain multiple SMOs. The civil rights experience suggests that informal coordination between different SMOs based on shared ideology and goals might afford the advantages of decentralization while simultaneously allowing sufficient centralized thrust to reap the advantages of bureaucratization (McAdam 1982).

THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Theories of the outcomes of social movements have traditionally been framed in terms of a "closed system" model of development, arguing that movements pass through a standard evolutionary sequence or "life cycle" culminating in either collapse or bureaucratization and institutional accommodation (Hopper 1950; Lang & Lang 1961). In contrast, resource mobilization theorists have adopted an "open system" approach, arguing that the outcomes of movements are critically shaped by the larger political environment. The outcomes of challenges depend not only on strategic choices but also on the stance of political elites and the support/opposition of established interest organizations and other movements. The balance of supports and social controls is, in turn, shaped by changes in governing coalitions, the structure of regimes, and societal changes that give rise to regime crises.

The major debates have centered around Gamson's (1975) relatively elementary analysis of the success and failure of 53 randomly selected movement organizations active in the United States between 1800 and 1945. Gamson measured success by two dimensions: the provision of tangible benefits that meet goals established by the movement organizations, and the formal acceptance of the movement organization by its main antagonist as a valid representative of a legitimate set of interests. Movement outcomes fall into four categories: full success; cooptation (acceptance but no benefits); preemption (benefits but no acceptance); and failure. In general, successful movement organizations were bureaucratic, pursued narrow goals, employed selective incentives, enjoyed sponsorship, used unruly methods (including violence), and made their demands during periods of sociopolitical crises. Coopted organizations tended to have larger memberships and formalized structures; they mounted their challenges during wartime. Preempted organizations were typically small, centrally controlled, and less active during crisis periods.

While reanalysis has essentially reconfirmed Gamson's major findings (Steedly & Foley 1979), Goldstone (1980) has argued that the organizational and strategic considerations are largely irrelevant once controls have been introduced for the goals (displacement vs nondisplacement of antagonists) and political context (crisis vs noncrisis) of the challenges. Nondisplacement organizations consistently succeed, suggesting that the American polity is highly receptive to reform movements. Success tends to occur during crisis periods, suggesting the movements have little control over their effectiveness. However, Gamson (1980) has effectively challenged these contentions, demonstrating that Goldstone's conclusions are based on an erroneous recoding of several cases, a significant narrowing of the meaning of success, and an ambiguous interpretation of "crisis" periods. Goldstone defines success in

terms of any tangible benefits regardless of whether secured from the main or secondary antagonists. Moreover, "crisis" is treated in an ad hoc manner, including not only depressions and wars but virtually any rapid social change affecting the group in question.

In fact, the Gamson model is more vulnerable to the opposite charge, that it employs too narrow a concept of success. Turner & Killian, for example, have offered three criteria of success: benefits for members; changes in power relations; and the realization of a "program for the reform of society" (1972: 256). The first two criteria are the most useful for comparative purposes insofar as the latter is relative to the specific movement and constitutes more of an idealized yardstick than a clear criterion. Even using this narrowed range, Gamson's criteria are extremely limited, dealing only with tangible forms of the first and relatively weak measures of the second. While intangible gains such as improved self-images may be less measurable, they are clearly significant movement goals. Even more problematic is Gamson's assessment of changes in power relations. Broadly speaking, changes in social power (cf. Lukes 1974; Domhoff 1979:121–50) can be assessed in three ways: short-term changes in the outcomes of legitimate decisions (e.g. public policy outcomes); alterations in the composition and organization of decision-making elites (e.g. elite circulation and changes in regimes); and long-term changes in the distribution of socially valued goods (e.g. the transformation of class structures and societal prestige hierarchies). Formal acceptance is an extremely weak measure of the second dimension. In the post–New Deal period in the United States, for example, political elites have increasingly allowed movement leaders to participate formally in public hearings and legal proceedings. Formal access, however, has not consistently led to tangible policy gains, in part because of the contingencies of policy implementation (Handler 1978). In fact, such formal access has often misled potential supporters into believing that their interests were being taken into account, thereby reducing mobilization and the likelihood of significant gains (Edelman 1971). In other words, cooptation should be deleted from the list of successful outcomes and a broader range of changes in power relations included.

The most direct challenge to the Gamson model has been Piven & Cloward's (1977) argument that poor people's movements derive their gains solely from mass defiance and that building permanent membership organizations is inherently counterproductive, *(a)* because poor people are unable to construct permanent political organizations in the fashion of more well-to-do segments, and *(b)* owing to the demobilizing effects of organization building. Instead of focusing commitments and maximizing strategic flexibility, formalized organizations divert energies from mass defiance and provide political elites with a forum for propagating symbolic reassurances and thereby demobilizing mass defiance. Evidence supporting the theory comes from studies of the policy

impacts of the urban riots of the 1960s. With the sole exception of Albritton's (1979), these studies have found that the size and damages of these riots gave rise to the expansion of welfare rolls and expenditures on welfare and related social programs (Button 1978; Jennings 1979; Issac & Kelly 1981; Griffin, Devine & Wallace 1981; Hicks & Swank 1981). Piven & Cloward appear to be correct on two counts: Formalized organization is not a prerequisite for mass defiance, and the institutional disruptions created by mass defiance do give rise to short-term tangible benefits.

The major flaw in the Piven-Cloward theory is the contention that formalized organization is inherently incompatible with mass defiance. Gamson's data, for example, show a positive relation between the degree of organization and unruliness. Of the 53 organizations, those that used violence or other constraints were more likely to be formalized and centrally controlled than the others (62% and 75% vs 45% and 53%). Moreover, several recent poor people's movements have made effective use of formalized organization. The United Farm Workers' Union, for example, has not only constructed a formalized, centrally controlled organization but has used this structure to organize successful mass strikes (Jenkins 1984). Likewise, membership organizing by the welfare rights movement was actually quite effective. At least between 1967 and 1970, organizing chapters and mobilizing mass defiance went hand in hand (West 1981:292–303). The key shift came in 1970 as state legislatures and welfare administrators curtailed the special grant programs that had furnished NWRO organizers with selective incentives, thereby undercutting membership organizing and leaving leaders with few alternatives to legislative lobbying.

While unruliness in general appears to be effective, the picture is more mixed regarding the various forms of disruption. Snyder & Kelly (1976), for example, have argued that while successful strikes in Italy are associated with both collective violence and the size of union membership, it is membership size that explains the link between violence and strike success. The efficacy of violence also depends on the institutional context and goals of the movement. Burstein (1981) has shown that the urban riots may have generated increased welfare spending but they also worked against the passage of civil rights legislation. At the same time, peaceful demonstrations were productive, both directly by pressuring political elites and indirectly by stimulating shifts in public opinion. Similarly, peaceful protests by the anti-war movement between 1964 and 1970 were effective in bringing about a shift in public opinion and legitimizing the option of withdrawl, thereby spurring favorable shifts in Senate voting on Vietnam War motions. After 1970, however, protests were counterproductive as further shifts in public opinion ceased, fiscal considerations became paramount in Congress, and the issue became the nature, pace, and details of withdrawal (Burstein & Freudenberg 1978). The efficacy of violence also

depends on the significance of third parties or bystander publics to the outcome. Because violence tends to alienate such third parties, it reduces the likelihood of success in settings in which third party support is critical (Schumaker 1978; Garrow 1978:158–60).

Because mass media coverage is decisive in informing elites and mass publics about movement actions as well as in forming the morale and self-image of movement activists, the mass media are important actors in political conflicts. Coverage, however, depends upon the structure of the media organizations. Large city newspapers with middle-class and elite readerships and specialized news staffs are more likely than smaller, less professionalized papers to cover protest actions (Goldenberg 1976). Similarly, until the television networks developed professional news staffs in the late 1950s, this medium was unavailable. Subtler are the effects of selective reportage and framing. Under pressure from the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, the national news managers systematically reduced their coverage of mass demonstrations (Hodgson 1976:374–79). In addition, the frames used routinely by the news media in presenting stories impose their own constraints. News must be "novel" and "interesting." Movements must therefore walk the fine line between outlandishness (which alienates third parties but secures coverage) and conventionality (which may be persuasive but is ignored by the media). Moreover, news coverage is often unsuitable for movement proselytizing. News stories emphasize action rather than context, leaving readers ignorant of the causes and goals of the movement. In the long run, media-based mobilization is a weak substitute for more direct methods. Media coverage also tends to make superstars out of movement leaders, aggravating internal rivalries and tendencies towards showmanship, thereby weakening mobilization (Molotch 1979; Gitlin 1980).

Because of the vulnerabilities of media coverage, the most important alliances with third parties are probably formed independently. The successful boycotts of the United Farm Workers, for example, depended on strong support from liberal churches and organized labor, both of which had been sponsors prior to the protest campaigns (Jenkins 1983). Similarly, the increasing political influence of the NAACP during the late 1960s was due in part to the increasing strength and density of interorganizational sponsorship ties that developed independently of media coverage (Aveni 1978).

In general, these studies support Tilly's (1978:125–33) thesis that entry into the polity by forging alliances with polity members is the central ingredient in success. Polity access creates a qualitative increment in the returns to collective action and shelters the movement against repression. The clearest evidence is provided by Ragin, Coverman & Hayward's (1982) study of English strikes. After the English working class secured the electoral franchise in 1918, the Labour Party secured parliamentary representation and became strong enough

to enter several governing coalitions. Strike success rates increased dramatically and the ratio of resource investments (strike days per man) to strike gains declined sharply.

Which circumstances make for political access? Tilly (1978:213–14) has offered a political interpretation, arguing that the formation of a member/challenger coalition depends largely on the calculus of short-term political advantages for polity members. If the polity is closely divided, members have lost their normal coalition partners, or members find themselves in jeopardy for want of resources, the normally risky strategy of supporting the entry of a movement is more likely to be adopted. If the coalition is successful, the movement secures access and, depending on its base of power, the rules of polity membership are restructured. Others have traced such regime crises to underlying economic tranformations. Piven & Cloward (1977), for example, have argued that poor people's movements secure access only during regime crises created by such major economic dislocations as depressions and the wholescale reorganization of regional economies. Major dislocations simultaneously weaken previously dominant groups and exacerbate cleavages among national elites, thereby increasing the likelihood of an elite division that could lead to elite support for movements. Similarly, Skocpol (1979) has argued that social revolutions are created through generalized regime crises, typically induced by fiscal overloads and major losses in warfare that aggravate long-standing conflicts between dominant groups and, by weakening the repressive capacity of the state, open the way for large-scale peasant uprisings.

These formulations can also be extended to deal with the routine shifts in political power that create opportunities for access by reform movements. The processes depend on the rules governing polity access. In liberal democratic regimes, the state is potentially an "alternative power system" regulated by the mobilization of organized numbers (Schattschneider 1960; Wrong 1979:197–217). Polity access is therefore regulated by broad shifts in public opinion and the mobilization of electoral coalitions that bring about changes in governing coalitions. If a favorable governing coalition is in power, reform movements with a large organized membership can offer electoral support in exchange for entry into the polity. For example, the successful entry of the moderate wing of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s stemmed from routine changes in political power. Following World War II, southern whites gradually became more tolerant of race relations reform, presumably because of the declining significance of the plantation economy to which the Jim Crow system had historically been tied (Burstein 1979). Simultaneously, black migration to northern cities placed black voters in a strategic position in national elections, providing the margin of victory in several major industrial states (Brink & Harris 1964). The increasing "swing" character of the black vote accelerated this tendency, forcing national candidates of both parties to pay increasing

attention to it. The final element was the landslide 1964 election, placing a center/left governing coalition firmly in power based on the votes of the white ethnic working class, the solid South, increasing numbers of upper-middle class liberals and, of course, urban blacks. In control of both the Presidency and Congress for the first time since the 1930s, this center/left coalition forced through an extension of the "New Deal revolution" that included the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, thereby enfranchising southern blacks and dismantling the Jim Crow system.

Because they shape political opportunities, broad electoral shifts linked to changes in governing coalitions also regulate the expansion and contraction of the social movement sector. The dynamic of expansion is largely created by two factors: the stimulus of increasing opportunities, and the "demonstration effect" of movement success. The dominance of a center/left governing coalition generally increases the opportunities for reform movements by reducing the likelihood of repression and increasing the likelihood of sponsorship by polity members. Likewise, a successful challenge boosts the morale of other challengers, provides models of effective tactics, and frequently frees up institutional resources for other movements. The dynamic also works in reverse. The proliferation of movements can undermine electoral coalitions by interjecting issues that stimulate a backlash by former coalition members who then transfer their electoral support to a center/right governing coalition. Once in power, this new governing coalition moves to demobilize the social-movement sector, stepping up repression against movement activists and attempting to curtail institutional supports for movements. In broad terms, this dynamic appears to fit the expansion and contraction of the social-movement sector during the 1960s and 1970s in the United States (Jenkins 1982b) and appears to be a standard feature of the political process of social reform in liberal democratic regimes (Tarrow 1982).

The rules governing routine political processes also shape the composition of the social-movement sector and its links to electoral processes. In the United States, single-member districts and Presidential government have institutionalized a two-party system with weak party organizations that rely more on patronage than ideology to mobilize support. In several of the Western European liberal democracies, proportional representation and parliamentary government have institutionalized a multi-party system populated by ideological parties with more stable bases of support. As a result of these factors, social movements in the United States are more likely to be independent of partisan alliances, adopting single-issue strategies rather than linking their programs to electoral campaigns and broader ideological definitions of political issues. In this sense, the success of reform movements is probably more dependent on electoral outcomes in Western Europe than in the United States. At the same time, however, the recent development of neocorporatist representation mechanisms in several Western European democracies has worked

against this link, reducing the power of party leaders and parliamentary coalitions and strengthening the hand of state managers and the representatives of the dominant private interest associations (Schmitter 1979). The extent to which neocorporatist relations will allow the selective cooptation of new movements or force challengers into broad opposition party efforts in the future remains unclear. If Nelkin & Pollack's (1981) study of the anti-nuclear power movement in West Germany and France is indicative, the central factors will be the centralization of state institutions and the restrictiveness of access to decision-making bodies. The greater prominence of the oppositional Green party movement in West Germany flows from the greater permeability of a federal as opposed to a unitary state and the greater degree of public access to governmental agencies. In this setting, neocorporatism has not successfully deflected the movement.

THE FUTURE OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

The future of resource mobilization theory lies in two directions: extending the basic polity model to deal with a broader variety of regimes, and refining the basic mobilization model by developing a more sophisticated social psychology of collective action. The central concern of the polity model is the link between regime changes and opportunities for political access. Research has been confined largely to liberal democratic regimes, linking movement access to changing electoral alignments, governing coalitions, and the institutional structure of the state. The development of neocorporatism offers the most provocative thesis for future analysis. Will neocorporatism allow governing elites to deflect and selectively coopt movements or force challengers into broader third party coalitions? Where neocorporatism is weakly developed (as in the United States), will partisan coalitions and alliances with polity members continue to regulate the access of single-issue reform movements? The largest vacuum lies in the analysis of authoritarian and one-party regimes. Are liberal democracies actually more permeable? Do elite cleavages within these regimes play the same role as partisan clashes in opening or closing access? Do corporatist devices have the same implications as in liberal democracies?

The central concern of the mobilization model is the link between collective interests and the pooling of resources. Collective interests are assumed to be relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilization, instead of being socially constructed and created by the mobilization process. The critique of the Olson theory, however, suggests that collective interests are often emergent. How are such collective identities formed? Is resocialization central? Is there a logic of emergence that governs the content of such collective identities? Calhoun (1982), for example, has argued that "radical" definitions emerge only among densely connected informal communities that perceive threats as effect-

ing their complete way of life. Paige (1975), in contrast, argues that this is because of the underlying zero-sum conflict of interests prevalent in traditional agrarian production systems. How indeterminant are such collective redefinitions of interests?

Once resource mobilization theory has expanded its scope in these two directions, it will have served its major purpose, linking the study of social movements to a comparative political sociology of states and regimes and to a more sophisticated social psychology of collective action.

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